California voters weigh 'radical' changes to justice system

By Stephanie McNeal

California’s justice system has been in the news for all the wrong reasons lately, as the state struggles to deal with a prison-overcrowding crisis that has embroiled it in a long court fight. 

Voters this fall, however, could approve big -- and some say "dangerous" -- changes to the state’s sentencing system, aimed in part at easing the overcrowding. On the state ballot is a proposal that would dramatically change how the state treats certain “nonserious, nonviolent” drug and property crimes, by downgrading them from felonies to misdemeanors.

The measure is being slammed as dangerous by members of California’s law enforcement, including San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman. 

Zimmerman told FoxNews.com “virtually the entire law enforcement community opposes Prop 47.”

“It will require the release of thousands of dangerous inmates,” she said.

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Siri's Dead Body Joke Is Evidence in a Murder Trial

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IMAGE: MASHABLE, NIKI WALKER

BY SAMANTHA MURPHY KELLY

UPDATED, 2:20 p.m. ET

A 20-year-old Florida man accused of killing his friend had an image on his phone depicting a query asking Siri, the iPhone's voice assistant, for tips on where to hide a dead body, according to evidence introduced at his murder trial.

During the trial of Pedro Bravo, who is charged with kidnapping, strangling and murdering his friend Christian Aguilar in September 2012, prosecutors showed evidence that he had a photo of a Siri search that said, "I need to hide my roommate."

SEE ALSO: 10 Places You're Not Allowed to See on Google Maps

Judge: Dad Should Have ‘Beat The Hell Out Of’ Teen Who Brutally Beat Man, So Just SIX MONTHS In Jail

Eric Owens

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Prosecutors in Detroit are hopping mad after a judge’s shocking decision on Thursday to give a teenager who participated in the brutal beating of a 54-year-old man a prison sentence of just six months.

The defendant, 19-year-old Latrez Cummings, was among 20 or so people who pummeled the man, Steve Utash, after Utash accidentally struck a 10-year-old boy with his vehicle on Detroit’s east side, then made the mistake of getting out of his car to assist the child.

The violent incident happened in April. A registered nurse on the scene told a local radio station that she eventually intervened because “there was nothing else they could do to him but kill him.” (RELATED: Detroit Driver Brutally Beaten By Teens After He Hits Boy, Gets Out Of Truck)

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Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

United States v. Sarno

Docket: 12-1656	Opinion Date: March 24, 2014
Judge: Flaum
Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Through Amusements Inc., owned by Szaflarski, a criminal enterprise distributed “video gambling devices” to bars and restaurants. The machines allow customers to deposit money in return for virtual credits and are legal for amusement only. The enterprise and the establishments, however, permitted customers to redeem credits for cash. The devices were modified to track money coming in and payouts, so that establishment owners and the enterprise could divide the profits. When a rival company encroached on Amusements Inc.’s turf, the enterprise placed a pipe bomb outside the rival’s headquarters. In addition to gambling, the enterprise committed home and jewelry‐store robberies, fenced stolen items through Goldberg Jewelers, owned by Polchan, and dealt in stolen cigarettes and electronics. Sarno was at the top of the enterprise’s hierarchy, followed by Polchan. Volpendesto was a perpetrator of robberies. The three were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Sarno and Polchan were indicted for conducting an illegal gambling business, 18 U.S.C. 1955; and Polchan for additional counts, including use of an explosive device, conspiracy to do so, 18 U.S.C. 844(i) and (n), and conspiracy to obstruct justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(k). Others indicted included Szaflarski and Volpendesto’s father, and two police officers. Most entered pleas. Volpendesto, Polchan, and Sarno were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the sentences.

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Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al

Docket: 13-1142	Opinion Date: February 28, 2014
Judge: per curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request.

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Daily Opinion Summaries Illinois Supreme Court - Civil Rights, Criminal Law,

Bartlow v. Costigan Docket: 115152 Opinion Date: February 21, 2014 Judge: Kilbride Areas of Law: Business Law, Construction Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law The Illinois Department of Labor sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of investigation of possible violation of the Employee Classification Act, 820 ILCS 185/3.25 by misclassifying employees as independent contractors. Jack’s provided the Department with requested information. Preliminary determination found misclassification of 10 individuals for eight to 160 days and calculated a potential penalty of $1,683,000. The Department requested a response within 30 days for consideration before final determination. Less than a month later, the Department sent notice of a second investigation Jack's sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional as violating: the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution because it subjects the construction industry to more stringent employment standards than other industries; the due process clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions because it does not provide an opportunity to be heard and is impermissibly vague; the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder because it is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; and the equal protection clauses of both constitutions because no other industry is subjected to the same standards when seeking to hire independent contractors. On remand, the court denied relief, finding the Act valid and enforceable. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, rejecting facial constitutional challenges. A procedural due process challenge to enforcement provisions has been rendered moot by the recent amendments to the Act, which must be applied to plaintiffs in the future. The court also affirmed that section 10 of the Act is not unconstitutionally vague. Remaining constitutional challenges to the Act were forfeited. http://j.st/Zku2 View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riseborough Docket: 114271 Opinion Date: February 21, 2014 Judge: Burke Areas of Law: Injury Law, Insurance Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics In the underlying litigation, the attorney represented a contractor being sued for job-site injuries and was later sued by the contractor’s insurance company for signing settlement agreements without authority. Section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3, sets forth a six-year statute of repose for “action[s] for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise … against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services.” The trial court held that the provision barred claims for breach of implied warranty of authority, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation against the attorney. The appellate court reversed, finding that the statute of repose did not apply to an action brought by a non-client of the defendant-lawyer for a cause of action other than legal malpractice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the dismissal, stating that under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, the claims “arose out of” the attorney’s actions “in the performance of professional services.” http://j.st/ZkuX View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

In re James W. Docket: 114483 Opinion Date: February 21, 2014 Judge: Karmeier Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Health Law James, a 60-year old with a lengthy criminal record and a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, has been held involuntarily at the Chester Mental Health Center since 2003, under successive involuntary commitment orders entered after he had reached the mandatory parole date on his criminal sentences. As the most recent order was about to expire, the Chester facility filed a petition under the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813) alleging that James continued to be subject to involuntary admission, with certificates from a psychiatrist and a psychologist, stating that James was “[a] person with mental illness who, because of his illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future … is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm.” The petition was filed on April 29, 2010. The court set the matter for May 5, 2010. James’s attorney appeared on that date and obtained an order for independent evaluation. The independent doctor was prepared to testify that James should remain at Chester; on May 19 James’s attorney advised the court that his client had elected to have a jury. James agreed to wait unit the first available jury date in August. At trial on August 23, James expressed surprise that he had a court date and stated that he was not feeling any better. The jury returned a unanimous verdict that James was subject to involuntary admission. The appellate court held that under these particular circumstances, the delay between the jury request and the actual hearing was significant enough to be prejudicial to the patient and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that, given all of his circumstances, the delay following James’s request for a jury trial did not cause him any prejudice. http://j.st/Zkum View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals - Civil Rights, criminal Law,

Shell Oil Co. v. Parko Docket: 13-8024 Opinion Date: January 17, 2014 Judge: Posner Areas of Law: Class Action, Environmental Law About 150 property owners in a village near the Mississippi River claim that defendants’ refinery leaked benzene and other contaminants into the groundwater. They sued, alleging nuisance and related torts. The district court certified the class. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court first rejected an argument that most class members had suffered no injury. How many class members have a valid claim is determined after certification. Predominance of issues common to all class members, like other certification requirements, goes to the efficiency of a class action as an alternative to individual suits. In this case, the alleged contamination occurred over a 90‐year period and involved different levels of contamination, caused by different polluters. Not every class member has experienced the same diminution in property value even if everyone had the same level of contamination. Plaintiff’s hydrogeologist, intended to measure contamination by the benzene levels in the groundwater beneath the plaintiffs’ properties, even though their water does not come from groundwater, but from an uncontaminated aquifer. It cannot be assumed that a decline in the value of property in the village is the result of proximity to a refinery. The district judge did not explore any of these issues, but treated predominance as a pleading requirement. http://j.st/vJa View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Nash v. Hepp Docket: 12-1786 Opinion Date: January 17, 2014 Judge: Sykes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Nash pleaded no contest to sexual assault of a child. He and his attorney signed and filed a form, acknowledging the 20-day period for filing a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief, which allows a defendant to challenge trial counsel’s performance with new appointed counsel before pursing direct appeal. After several months, Nash sought relief pro se. The circuit court denied the motion, informing Nash of the procedure for reinstating post-conviction and appeal rights. Instead of following that procedure, Nash appealed, arguing ineffective assistance. The court of appeals declined to appoint counsel and affirmed denial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Nash sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance. The district court denied Nash’s petition, concluding that he had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to present it in state court. Nash did not appeal, but nine months later unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Later, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel can excuse procedural default if counsel caused the default by abandoning the petitioner without notice. The district court denied a second motion, explaining that Nash caused his own procedural default by failing to adequately present his claims in his pro se attack. Before Nash appealed, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can also excuse procedural default if state law requires raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in collateral proceedings rather than by direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the state court advised Nash how he could correct counsel’s procedural error, but he did not do so. http://j.st/vJB View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

United States v. Washington Docket: 13-1468 Opinion Date: January 17, 2014 Areas of Law: Criminal Law DEA agents arrested Washington at the home of a suspected drug dealer they had been investigating and seized approximately 1.765 kilograms of cocaine from the residence. Washington admitted that he was attempting to purchase cocaine. He pled guilty to a single count of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and, with a sentencing guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment, was sentenced to 97 months. The judge said only that he had “considered all the factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)” and noted that Washington had been “involved in a serious crime, a serious crime in the sense of what it is doing to so many people in our society, not only the dealing of the drugs, but also the using of them.” The court also imposed a $500 fine. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, finding the “truncated explanation” insufficient. http://j.st/vJm View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hanson v. Beth

Docket: 13-1535	Opinion Date: December 17, 2013
Judge: Flaum

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

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U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals - Criminal Law, Class Actions

United States v. White Docket: 11-3240 Opinion Date: December 13, 2013 Judge: Flaum Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Real Estate & Property Law, White Collar Crime White, Ford, and Helton were involved in a mortgage fraud scheme through White’s company, EHNS. EHNS offered a “mortgage bailout” program, telling homeowners that they could avoid foreclosure by transferring their homes to EHNS for one year, that EHNS investors would pay the mortgage, that the owners could continue to live in their homes, and that they could reassume their mortgages at the program’s conclusion. EHNS investors actually took title outright. White would pressure appraisers to assess the properties at amounts higher than actual value. EHNS would strip actual and manufactured equity by transaction fees. Clients almost never were able to buy back their homes. Lenders foreclosed on many of the properties. Through fraudulent mortgage loan applications, White obtained financing for straw purchasers. Ford was the closing agent, supposed to act as the lender’s representative, but actually fabricating official documents. Helton was the attorney and “represented” homeowners at White’s behest, pocketing legal fees paid out of the equity proceeds and orchestrating a cover‐up by representing the homeowners in subsequent bankruptcy filings. All were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; Helton was also convicted of bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, challenges to joinder of the defendants and to jury instructions, and a Brady claim. http://j.st/FR9 View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Norem v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. Docket: 12-1816 Opinion Date: December 13, 2013 Judge: Rovner Areas of Law: Class Action, Contracts, Insurance Law In 1994, Norem purchased a “Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Policy” from Lincoln Benefit. With variable life insurance, part of the premium is allocated to the insurer’s investment funds, called subaccounts. Policyholders may move their investments within the subaccounts and the death benefit, which is guaranteed not to fall below a certain amount. With variable universal life, the policyholder may easily invest and alter insurance coverage. The policy is comprised of the policy value, which represents the investment component, and its net amount at risk, which represents the insurance component. Norem purchased his policy because he wanted both life insurance and an investment vehicle for the proceeds from the sale of his ownership of a medical business. The policy has a “cost of insurance” (COI) charge deducted monthly from the policy. The policy explains how the COI rate is calculated. Norem filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated policyholders, claiming that Lincoln Benefit breached the terms of its policies in its method of calculating the COI rate.Before deciding on class certification, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincoln Benefit, concluding that its calculation of COI rates did not breach the contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. http://j.st/FRj View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

United States v. Garcia-Avila Docket: 13-1313 Opinion Date: December 13, 2013 Judge: Bauer Areas of Law: Criminal Law As part of an immunity agreement, a confidential informant agreed to pose as an individual looking to buy drugs and met with Quiroz, whom he had known for several years, and three other men: Mendez, Figueroa, and Garcia. The CI wore a wire and secretly recorded conversations about purchasing “ice,” a slang term for methamphetamine, and other drugs. Garcia was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and attempted distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred when it allowed expert testimony about the meaning of “code” phrases and admitted evidence of his prior ecstasy transactions and that the prosecution’s statement, “and he does those things” during rebuttal arguments unfairly prejudiced the jury. http://j.st/FRM View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

United States v. Huart - US 7th Circuit

United States v. Huart

Docket: 13-2075	Opinion Date: November 22, 2013
Judge: Tinder
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2008 Huart pled guilty to possessing child pornography, and was sentenced to 65 months. In 2011, he was transferred to a private halfway house that contracts with the Bureau of Prisons. Rules provided to Huart included one that “[d]uring intake, all belongings will be searched and inventoried. Any new items brought into the facility or removed from the facility will be reported to staff so the inventory can be adjusted.” Huart was not permitted to possess a cell phone. Rules governing inmates who were allowed to have cell phones specified that “ANY STAFF may request at ANY TIME to view the contents of [an inmate’s] cell phone with or without reason.” Huart signed “Conditions of Residential Community Programs,” which stated that he was subject to frequent searches of his living area by staff. An employee conducting a random search of Huart’s room found a cell phone on his bed. A house director discovered 214 images, including child pornography. Huart admitted to possessing the phone and the images. The FBI obtained a search warrant, but thel phone was passcode protected and had to be sent to FBI Headquarters. Agents did not unlock the phone until February 14, 2012; the warrant specified that the search was to be conducted before December 15, 2011. The district court denied motions to suppress, finding that Huart did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search of his phone was conducted properly under the warrant. Huart pleaded guilty, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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Illinois Supreme Court Summaries

People v. Radojcic

Docket: 114197	Opinion Date: November 20, 2013
Judge: Theis
Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, White Collar Crime

Radojcic, his daughters, his attorney Helfand, and the office manager for one of his companies, were indicted for 52 financial crimes involving fraud on mortgage lenders. It was also alleged that Radojcic, while owing the IRS more than two million dollars, fraudulently obtained rental checks exceeding $500,000 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After discovery, the state indicated its intent to call Helfand as a witness in exchange for use immunity. Helfand and Radojcic objected, asserting attorney-client privilege, and the trial court struck Helfand’s name from the state’s witness list. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies when a client seeks the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity. Transcripts of grand jury testimony met the standard of providing a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of a crime or fraud by Radojcic and a reasonable basis to suspect that communications with Helfand were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. The state met its burden of overcoming the privilege; there was no need to examine Helfand in camera prior before trial testimony. The only attorney-client communications that are subject to disclosure are those related to transactions identified in the indictment.

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Morrow v. May - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Docket: 12-1329	Opinion Date: November 8, 2013
Judge: Posner

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.

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Hardaway v. Meyerhoff - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Docket: 12-2856	Opinion Date: November 4, 2013
Judge: Bauer

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2856

MAURICE HARDAWAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRETT MEYERHOFF, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:10-cv-00556-JPG-PMF — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2013 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 4, 2013

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2856/12-2856-2013-11-04.html

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Discovery Evolutions Hold Promise for Greater Privacy Benefits for Litigants