HOW THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EMPOWERS CONGRESS TO END BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP

by KEN KLUKOWSKI 6 Jul 2014, 4:44 PM PDT POST A COMMENT

If an illegal alien has a child on American soil, the Constitution does not require the child be granted American citizenship. Congress can give citizenship to anyone it wants, but the Fourteenth Amendment only commands citizenship to persons born on U.S. soil to parents who are not citizens of a foreign country.

Part of the chaos on America’s southern border is driven by illegal aliens seeking to have “anchor babies.” Under the current Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), if an illegal alien has a baby on U.S. soil, that baby is an American citizen.

Since all citizens have a right to be here, the illegal adult then cites the need to keep families together as justifying the parents' staying in the U.S. for the rest of their lives, and “family reunification” is cited as grounds for bringing the rest of the family to the United States.

However, Congress could change that law any time, because it goes far beyond what the Constitution commands. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment begins, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

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No, No,No! Not the Fighting Irish!!! _ Is nothing sacred anymore?

Scandal at Notre Dame

Leslie C. Griffin

Justia guest columnist, UNLV law professor, and visiting UC Irvine law professor Leslie Griffin comments on the recent controversy regarding Notre Dame, of which she is an alumna. Professor Griffin comments on Notre Dame’s arguments, which include one relating to the Catholic concept of scandal, and another that postulates that whenever Notre Dame signs the form objecting to contraception, the complaint triggers the provision of free objectionable coverage to Notre Dame’s employees in a manner contrary to its beliefs. Notre Dame also argues that by signing the objection, it facilitates contraception, and, by doing so, it will lead many to think that Notre Dame condones these services, and hence undermines its role, as a Catholic educational institution, to educate others on a matter of religious and moral significance. Griffin offers strong counterarguments, both logical and legal, to Notre Dame’s contentions. Continue reading →

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Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al

Docket: 13-1142	Opinion Date: February 28, 2014
Judge: per curiam
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request.

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U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hanson v. Beth

Docket: 13-1535	Opinion Date: December 17, 2013
Judge: Flaum

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

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Can a Trial Court, Consistent with the First Amendment, Order an Attorney to Take Down Part of Her Website During Trial? - See more at: http://verdict.justia.com/2013/11/25/can-trial-court-consistent-first-amendment-order-attorney-take-part-website-trial#sthash.8nlGuzja.dpuf

On October 30 of this year, in the case of Steiner et al. v. The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, an interesting First Amendment question arose. One of the attorney’s websites advertised that she had had success in two prior cases that were similar to the case that she was about to try. (They were personal injury actions, all with similar facts.) The Court, in response, ordered that the attorney had to take down the relevant portion of her website—that is, the portion that discussed that attorney’s favorable outcomes in similar cases. - See more at: 

http://verdict.justia.com/2013/11/25/can-trial-court-consistent-first-amendment-order-attorney-take-part-website-trial#sthash.8nlGuzja.dpuf

Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis - Justia Verdict

Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis

Docket: 13-1629	Opinion Date: November 25, 2013
Judge: Kanne
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Health Law

In 2005, Indianapolis and Marion County passed an ordinance prohibiting smoking in most buildings frequented by the general public, with exceptions for bars and taverns with liquor licenses that neither served nor employed people under the age of 18, tobacco bars, and bowling alleys. In 2012, the City-County Council expanded the ordinance by eliminating many exceptions. As amended, the ordinance included exceptions for private residences, retail tobacco stores, tobacco specialty bars, and private clubs that voted to permit smoking. Bar owners affected by the ordinance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting due process, equal protection, takings and freedom of association claims under both the federal and Indiana constitutions. The district court upheld the ban. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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United States v. Huart - US 7th Circuit

United States v. Huart

Docket: 13-2075	Opinion Date: November 22, 2013
Judge: Tinder
Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2008 Huart pled guilty to possessing child pornography, and was sentenced to 65 months. In 2011, he was transferred to a private halfway house that contracts with the Bureau of Prisons. Rules provided to Huart included one that “[d]uring intake, all belongings will be searched and inventoried. Any new items brought into the facility or removed from the facility will be reported to staff so the inventory can be adjusted.” Huart was not permitted to possess a cell phone. Rules governing inmates who were allowed to have cell phones specified that “ANY STAFF may request at ANY TIME to view the contents of [an inmate’s] cell phone with or without reason.” Huart signed “Conditions of Residential Community Programs,” which stated that he was subject to frequent searches of his living area by staff. An employee conducting a random search of Huart’s room found a cell phone on his bed. A house director discovered 214 images, including child pornography. Huart admitted to possessing the phone and the images. The FBI obtained a search warrant, but thel phone was passcode protected and had to be sent to FBI Headquarters. Agents did not unlock the phone until February 14, 2012; the warrant specified that the search was to be conducted before December 15, 2011. The district court denied motions to suppress, finding that Huart did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search of his phone was conducted properly under the warrant. Huart pleaded guilty, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Summaries for November 22, 2013 Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of IN Communications Law, Constitutional Law

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Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of IN Docket: 11-3265 Opinion Date: November 21, 2013 Judge: Rovner Areas of Law: Communications Law, Constitutional Law Indiana enacted the Automated Dialing Machine Statute, which bans “robocalls” unless the receiver has consented to the calls in advance, Ind. Code 24–5–14–1, with limited exemptions. School districts may send messages to students and parents and employers may send messages to employees. There is no exception for political calls. Patriotic Veterans, an Illinois not‐for‐profit corporation whose purpose is to inform voters of positions taken by candidates and office holders on issues of interest to veterans, uses automatically dialed calls. For example, its website states that “in 2010, Patriotic Veterans, in partnership with singing idol Pat Boone sponsored nearly 1.9 million calls to veterans and seniors across the U.S. about cuts in Medicare as a result of the passage of Obamacare.” Patriotic Veterans claims that it cannot afford to make the calls without using an automatic dialer and a recorded message and that live operators cannot make calls fast enough when time is of the essence, such as on the eve of an election, and sought a declaration that the law violated the First Amendment and was preempted by the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which also regulates use of autodialers. The district court found that the TCPA preempted Indiana’s statute as applied to the interstate use of autodialers and entered an injunction against enforcement with regard to political messages. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to preemption and remanded for consideration of other issues. http://j.st/yKs View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Can You Use Pre-Suit Discovery To Unmask An Anonymous Blogger In Texas?

Europe: Mosley v Google – game, set but not match yet -

Morrow v. May - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Docket: 12-1329	Opinion Date: November 8, 2013
Judge: Posner

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.

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Hardaway v. Meyerhoff - Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Docket: 12-2856	Opinion Date: November 4, 2013
Judge: Bauer

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2856

MAURICE HARDAWAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRETT MEYERHOFF, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:10-cv-00556-JPG-PMF — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2013 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 4, 2013

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2856/12-2856-2013-11-04.html

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