United States v. Grady
Grady told Wolf that he wanted to blow up a Planned Parenthood clinic, then drove to a gas station and put some gas in his van and a smaller amount in a bottle. He drove to the clinic, broke a window with a hammer, poured gasoline into the building, and set it on fire. After seeing news reports of the fire, Wolf informed police that Grady may have been responsible. The police questioned Grady in a videotaped interview. Grady admitted that his “intention was to light the building,” and that he told friends that “I thought it f... burned right down.” Grady was charged with arson and intentionally damaging the property of a facility providing reproductive health services. At trial, Grady reiterated his desire to burn the clinic and referred to his anti-abortion views. The parties disputed how to define the term “maliciously” under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) for jury instructions. Neither the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions nor the court has defined the term. The district court used the government’s definition, explaining that Grady’s proposed instruction would shift the burden to the government to prove that the defendant acted without justification. The jury found Grady guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court’s decision to omit the words “without just cause or reason” from the instruction was supported by the record. A jury instruction should address an issue reasonably raised by the evidence. Grady did not point to any cognizable legal justification for starting the fire.
| ||||||||||
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.
Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.”
| ||||||||||
Illinois Social Media Law, Conservative News, Chicago & National Politics
Vote Trump 2016 !
Trump 2016
Showing posts with label 7th Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7th Circuit. Show all posts
Friday, March 28, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Thursday, March 27, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist.
| Docket: 13-1742 | Opinion Date: March 26, 2014 |
| Judge: Wood | |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law | |
Bass worked as a custodian. In 2002, she was assigned to work at a single-story elementary school. In 2003 a second story was added. A male was responsible for cleaning the second floor. In 2008–09, the District commissioned a study of custodial duties at 11 schools, which revealed that second floor took tasks more time than one shift permitted, while the first floor could be finished in less than one shift. While Bass was on leave, the District had the substitute custodian try a new arrangement. She was able to finish during her shift. The District reassigned second‐floor restrooms to Bass. The study also resulted in seven male custodians being assigned additional duties. Bass then had two suspensions without pay. She did not contest the suspensions; she had failed to complete her duties. Her work improved significantly. Before 2010, Bass had taken two leaves that exceeded the leave to which she was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. Bass injured her back in August 2010 and again took leave. The District told Bass that she would have no more available leave as of November 3, and would be fired if she failed to return to work. Bass returned to work on November 4. She injured her back again 12 days later and was out for 2.5 days. The District issued a reprimand. On January 3, Bass again did not report to work. She provided a doctor’s note, but exceeded available leave time. When asked when she would be able to return without restrictions, Bass did not reply. She was fired on February 2, for job abandonment. Three male custodians lost their jobs between 2008 and 2011 on the same ground. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on her sex discrimination claims. The district court dismissed her sit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| http://j.st/Z4Nz |  |
| View Case On: Justia Google Scholar | |
Friday, March 21, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
TABFG, LLC v. Pfeil
In 2003, a joint venture formed between llcs, TABFG and NT Prop, to trade securities. TABFG was responsible for trading and was comprised of three individual traders. NT Prop was to fund the venture, and included two limited liability corporations: NT Financial and Pfeil Commodities. The sole member of Pfeil Commodities was Richard Pfeil, the “money man.” NT Prop was managed by Pfeil’s attorney, and another. NT Prop provided $2 million start-up money and the traders earned profits of $3.4 million. Before forming TABFG, the traders were employees of SIG and were subject to restrictive covenants. The Agreement provided for payment of attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to escape the restriction. The traders sought a declaratory judgment. SIG responded by adding TABFG and NT Prop to the lawsuit, seeking disgorgement of profits. SIG obtained an injunction covering nine months after their departure from SIG, ending the joint venture. The parties failed to agree to a final accounting, but TABFG needed funds for a defense in the SIG lawsuit. Pfeil caused NT Prop to distribute $360,000 to TABFG, $533,023.69 to NT Financial, and $2,742,182.02 to Pfeil Commodities. TABFG sued, alleging that Pfeil, who was not an officer, director or manager of NT Prop, engineered a distribution of the bulk of the joint venture funds to himself and tortiously caused NT Prop to breach its obligations to TABFG under the Agreement. The district court judge agreed and awarded $957,659.68. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Houston
Houston, age 44, was caught with more than 1,000 pornographic images of children on his computer; he pleaded guilty to possessing and transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), (a)(5)(B). The probation officer calculated a guidelines sentence of 360 months, the statutory maximum for the two counts. At the sentencing hearing, the government presented evidence that on four occasions Houston sexually abused a neighbor when she came over to play with his daughter. In a videotaped police interview the girl, then five years old, described how Houston touched his “private” to her “private,” made her touch his “private,” and then covered her stomach, crotch, and hands in a substance coming out of his “private” that she referred to as “wax.” She described Houston’s home and his appearance. She stated that these events happened when she was three or four years old. The government provided a chat log from his computer in which he asked someone to fulfill his “fantasy” by ejaculating on a picture of an unidentified young girl. A 12-year-old girl said that Houston exposed himself to her and a three-year-old boy reported that someone in Houston’s home licked his penis. The court imposed a sentence of 216 months. He appealed a five-level increase tied to the sexual abuse of a minor, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Houston’s claim that the five-year-old girl’s statements were unreliable based on conflicting dates about when the girl informed her mother and different reasons for why the parents delayed in reporting the abuse.
| ||||||||||
Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.
The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate.
| ||||||||||
Monday, March 03, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee
| Docket: 12-3689 | Opinion Date: February 25, 2014 |
| Judge: Sykes | |
| Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Injury Law | |
The claimant alleges that Father Hanser, a former pastor at a Catholic Parish in Brookfield,Wisconsin, sexually abused him in the late 1970s when he was seven years old. In 2007 the claimant participated in a voluntary mediation program conducted by the Archdiocese to address claims of sexual abuse by priests. The mediation produced a settlement. The Archdiocese paid the claimant $100,000, and he released the Archdiocese from all claims relating to abuse by Father Hanser. When the Archdiocese filed its Chapter 11 petition four years later, the claimant submitted a claim based on the same allegations of abuse by Father Hanser, claiming that an Archdiocesan representative had fraudulently induced him to settle by giving him inaccurate information about when the Archdiocese first received reports of abuse by Father Hanser. The bankruptcy judge refused to set the agreement aside because the claimant had not shown that but for the alleged misrepresentations, he would not have accepted the settlement. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claimant failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial factor in his decision to accept the settlement and never made an offer of proof explaining what an expanded record would show.
| http://j.st/ZkV2 | |
| View Case On: Justia Google Scholar | |
This is just another example of an attempted continuation of the shakedown that has saddled the Catholic Church. I am a product of Catholic Education, in grammar, high school and College and never witnessed or even heard of anything even apprpoaching the abuses that have been alleged so many times.
Frankly, this whole mess, naton wide, STINKS TO HIGH HEAVEN! The "Plaintiffs" all know that the Church (allegedly) has a lot of money, so their 'abuse' allegations can be used to shake down the clergy, who often do not have the will, or the funds, to fight and simply give in and pays these "claims" which more often than not amount to little more than EXTORTION.
But the Catholic Chuch is seen as an easy target and once they have bankrupted one diocese, they simply look to the national or even Rome to make up the difference. The blue-suited gangsters aiding these 'claims' are little more than legalized con men.
Friday, February 28, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Moore v. Colvin
Moore applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging that she became disabled in 2007. An ALJ concluded that Moore suffered from a number of severe impairments, including migraine headaches, asthma, morbid obesity, and rheumatoid arthritis, and less severe impairments including irritable bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, hypothyroid and prolactin irregularities, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, and possible Crohn’s disease. The ALJ found that she was, nonetheless, capable of performing her past work and not entitled to benefits. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not err in considering evidence that Moore’s emergency room visits may have been related to an addiction problem, but the ALJ erred in failing to even acknowledge contrary evidence or to explain the rationale for crediting the identified evidence over contrary evidence. The ALJ never related Moore’s specific limitations to certain impairments. On remand, the ALJ must make those findings and present the limitations to the vocational expert to determine whether Moore is capable of performing her past relevant work.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Peters
Peters was a passenger in a Scion on I-70 in Indiana, traveling behind a Denali. Both cars displayed Ohio license plates. The cars aroused the suspicion of Officer Borgman, who followed the Denali and enlisted Deputy Ernstes to watch the Scion. Borgman stopped the Denali, which was found to contain heroin and other evidence of drug trafficking. Ernstes believed that the driver of the Scion, Adams, was following too closely and activated his emergency lights, Adams pulled over, denied that he was traveling with another vehicle, and stated that he had left his license at home. When his passenger, Peters, lowered his window, Ernstes smelled burnt marijuana and saw small green particles that he believed to be marijuana. Peters told the deputy that they were traveling with the Denali and that he had previously been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. During a pat-down, the deputy recovered $2500 cash from Peters’ pocket. He found a marijuana stem in the front passenger area and encountered a marijuana odor in a storage compartment that had a cracked lid and screws that appeared not to be original equipment. The deputy also found a cordless drill that contained a sticky substance, later found to match a substance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin in the Denali. Peters and the Denali passenger were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court concluded that probable cause existed and denied a motion to suppress. Peters entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Moore v. Colvin
Moore applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging that she became disabled in 2007. An ALJ concluded that Moore suffered from a number of severe impairments, including migraine headaches, asthma, morbid obesity, and rheumatoid arthritis, and less severe impairments including irritable bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, hypothyroid and prolactin irregularities, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, and possible Crohn’s disease. The ALJ found that she was, nonetheless, capable of performing her past work and not entitled to benefits. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not err in considering evidence that Moore’s emergency room visits may have been related to an addiction problem, but the ALJ erred in failing to even acknowledge contrary evidence or to explain the rationale for crediting the identified evidence over contrary evidence. The ALJ never related Moore’s specific limitations to certain impairments. On remand, the ALJ must make those findings and present the limitations to the vocational expert to determine whether Moore is capable of performing her past relevant work.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Peters
Peters was a passenger in a Scion on I-70 in Indiana, traveling behind a Denali. Both cars displayed Ohio license plates. The cars aroused the suspicion of Officer Borgman, who followed the Denali and enlisted Deputy Ernstes to watch the Scion. Borgman stopped the Denali, which was found to contain heroin and other evidence of drug trafficking. Ernstes believed that the driver of the Scion, Adams, was following too closely and activated his emergency lights, Adams pulled over, denied that he was traveling with another vehicle, and stated that he had left his license at home. When his passenger, Peters, lowered his window, Ernstes smelled burnt marijuana and saw small green particles that he believed to be marijuana. Peters told the deputy that they were traveling with the Denali and that he had previously been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. During a pat-down, the deputy recovered $2500 cash from Peters’ pocket. He found a marijuana stem in the front passenger area and encountered a marijuana odor in a storage compartment that had a cracked lid and screws that appeared not to be original equipment. The deputy also found a cordless drill that contained a sticky substance, later found to match a substance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin in the Denali. Peters and the Denali passenger were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court concluded that probable cause existed and denied a motion to suppress. Peters entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Castaldi
Castaldi, involved in fraudulent schemes since high school, operated a Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2008. Net losses to investors and the IRS totaled about $40 million. When the scheme was near collapse, Castaldi turned himself in to the government. He eventually pled guilty to just one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of corruptly impeding the IRS, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The district court imposed the longest prison sentence possible under the plea agreement: consecutive sentences of 20 years on the mail fraud charge and three years on the tax charge, about 50percent longer than the high end of the agreed Sentencing Guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that the court adequately considered the fact that Castaldi told the government about his scheme and cooperated with its investigation, but also considered the devastating financial harm Castaldi inflicted on family members, friends, and neighbors of modest financial means.
| ||||||||||
Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp.
A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.
| ||||||||||
Chaib v. Indiana
Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Thursday, February 20, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Rasario v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens' Annuity & Benefit Fund
Before 1992, Chicago police officers received pension credit for time worked for the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. In 1992, the Retirement Board began denying pension credit to retiring officers for prior service with the Sheriff’s Department. In 2008, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that this practice was improper under the Illinois Pension Code. Officers who had been denied pension credit sought reconsideration. The Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the final rulings after the statutory 35‐day limit. The officers did not seek review in state court, but filed a federal suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated officers, alleging violations of procedural due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. and state constitutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the officers’ complaint is, essentially, that Illinois law provides no procedure for making the appellate decision retroactive Their sole remedy lies with the political branches of Illinois government.
| ||||||||||
Carter v. City of Milwaukee
Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.
| ||||||||||
CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist.
Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.
| ||||||||||
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc,
When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan’s remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain’s commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel’s First Amendment defense, that its ad was “noncommercial” speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel’s ad prominently featured the “Jewel-Osco” logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad’s congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan.
| ||||||||||
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
7th Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions
United States v. Riney
Riney was found in the vicinity of a shooting, immediately after the incident occurred, and matched the general description of the shooter. When he exited his car and walked away from the officers, they saw what they believed to be a gun in his waistband. A gun was found during a pat-down. Riney was convicted of possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Riney had many felony convictions for violent crimes, though from many years earlier, to qualify as an armed career criminal under both 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and U.S. Sentencing Guideline 4B1.4. The district court sentenced Riney to 204 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both his conviction and sentence, rejecting claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence and in applying a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice to the offense level in its sentencing guideline calculation.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Sutton
Agent Lombardi received a tip from a confidential informant that he had seen “Cap” in possession of cocaine. The CI, who was familiar with cocaine distribution and had previously provided information that resulted in an arrest, provided the address at which he had seen “Cap.” Lombardi searched the name “Cap” in a law enforcement database. Todd Sutton was listed as a match for that alias. Lombardi obtained a booking photo of Sutton and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that “Cap” was Sutton. Lombardi drove the CI past the address. The CI confirmed the location and stated that the tenant was Foster, whom the CI believed to be Sutton’s girlfriend. A law enforcement database confirmed that Foster was the tenant; Lombardi later discovered that she was Sutton’s cousin. Lombardi took the CI before a judge; the CI signed a “John Doe” affidavit in support of a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents found: 63 grams of crack cocaine in a bedroom closet; male clothing and shoes in the same closet; a digital scale with white powder residue and other items frequently used to cook crack cocaine in the kitchen; a handwritten letter on the kitchen table referring to “Cap”; and a computer, on which agents viewed a video showing Sutton in the apartment. Only Sutton and Foster had keys to the apartment; she rarely entered the bedroom where the cocaine was found. Sutton pleaded guilty, retaining the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Wilson v. Cook County
Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Wednesday, February 05, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.
EAR, a subchapter S corporation, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In the years before its petition, EAR made federal income tax payments on behalf of its shareholders; eight of the payments in the two years preceding its petition. Once in Chapter 11, EAR, acting as debtor in possession, filed an adversary complaint against the government seeking to recover all nine payments as fraudulent transfers: the eight most recent payments under 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1), which provides for recovery of transfers made within two years of the filing, and the ninth under 11 U.S.C. 544(b), which enables a trustee to bring a state‐law fraudulent‐transfer action. EAR asserted that the IRS was precluded from raising sovereign immunity as a defense. The U.S. agreed to disgorge the eight payments, but contested EAR’s ability to recover the ninth payment under 544(b). The bankruptcy court rejected the government’s theory, finding that 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(1) abolished federal immunity from suit under listed bankruptcy causes of action, including section 544. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that 106(a)(1) does not displace the actual‐creditor requirement in section 544(b)(1). Ordinarily, a creditor cannot bring an Illinois fraudulent‐transfer claim against the IRS; therefore, under 544(b)(1), neither can the debtor in possession.
| ||||||||||
Domanus v. Lewicki
KBP is a Polish entity, formed to develop a business park near Krakow. Plaintiffs are KBP shareholders and defendants are either current or former shareholders. The plaintiffs alleged a fraudulent scheme to loot the company by payments for services never performed and sought relief under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(a)–(d), with supplemental state claims for fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, civil conspiracy, violation of the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and for an accounting. The defendants allegedly invested some of their proceeds in a Chicago subdivision. Polish authorities charged the defendants for crimes related to KBP. In the RICO civil suit, the defendants’ abuse of the discovery process resulted in several sanctions rulings; when the plaintiffs objected to the magistrate’s relatively lenient decisions, the district judge found the sanctions too light and imposed more onerous ones, including contempt and an order barring the defendants from using certain evidence, and ultimately a $413,000,000 default judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Adams v. City of Indianapolis
A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Alexander
Trying to avoid a traffic stop, Alexander lost control of his car and landed in a snow bank. Opening the door, Officer Honzel smelled “fresh raw cannabis.” Honzel called in a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted to the car’s center console. A search revealed six grams of marijuana divided into plastic bags, $365 in cash, a digital scale, cell phones, and a loaded gun, beneath the front passenger seat. Honzel testified that a cell phone displayed a text message inquiring about drugs. Another $470 in cash was found on Alexander’s person. Alexander was charged with possessing marijuana for distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a gun in connection with a drug crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). Alexander claimed that he did not know the marijuana and gun were in the car, which he did not own. He did not testify or present evidence to support the claim. The government presented no fingerprint or DNA evidence to establish that Alexander had touched the gun or the drug-related items. Alexander’s lawyer argued that Honzel’s account was not trustworthy and that the text message was not recovered. The prosecutor responded that Honzel had no incentive to falsely implicate Alexander and attempted to bolster the officer’s credibility. Alexander’s lawyer did not object to the remarks. Convicted, Alexander was sentenced to a term of 390 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prosecutor’s remarks strayed into improper vouching, but the errors were not serious and did not deprive Alexander of a fair trial or cause his convictions.
| ||||||||||
Rooni v. Biser
In November, 2005, Rooni and others went hunting. They shot three deer, which they took to a DNR post in a gas station for registration. While DNR employees tagged the deer, Rooni went inside. DNR agent Biser arrived and asked Rooni how many deer he had. Rooni did not respond. Biser proclaimed, loudly, that Rooni did not like the DNR. Rooni said “no, just people like you.” Biser left the station and leaned against the trailer while speaking to DNR employees. Rooni came out and attempted to walk around Biser. He had to pass closely because of slush on the ground. Biser extended his leg to block Rooni’s way. Rooni stopped and said, “let me get through,” and “brushed” between Biser and the trailer. Biser allegedly spit food at Rooni. As the encounter escalated, Rooni told his son to call the police. Biser told Rooni he was under arrest. While handcuffing Rooni, Biser allegedly jerked him back and made the cuffs too tight. While in the jail, Rooni did not seek medical attention. He had discoloration under his skin, painful hands and swollen fingers. Charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing an officer were dismissed. In April 2006, Rooni was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the handcuffing claim, citing qualified immunity. The court remanded Rooni’s arrest claim; taking his reasonable allegations as true, neither probable cause nor “arguable” probable cause supported an arrest.
| ||||||||||
Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n
The Indiana War Memorials Commission requires a permit for even small gatherings at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at Monument Circle in Indianapolis and at several other monuments. Smith and his young son were expelled from Monument Circle for protesting, without a permit, a proposed United Nations arms treaty. Smith sought an injunction against the policy’s enforcement. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified the treaty and that the permit policy has changed since the district court denied the motion. The new policy retains the problematic features of the old, so Smith’s appeal is not moot. Smith seems likely to succeed in showing that the 14‐person limit on demonstrations without a permit, and a provision that, if a gathering has been advertised or the public has been invited, a permit is required even if the group ultimately is made up of fewer than 15 people, are not narrowly tailored.
| ||||||||||
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)