Supreme Court of Illinois

Summaries for September 25, 2015 Walker v. McGuire Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law People v. Fiveash Criminal Law, Juvenile Law McElwain v. Ill. Sec'y of State Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Standard Bank & Trust Co. Banking, Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates, Real Estate & Property Law Lake Envtl., Inc. v. Arnold Civil Procedure Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan Labor & Employment Law, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Public Benefits O'Toole v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155 Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use People v. Goossens Criminal Law, Family Law Seymour v. Collins Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Injury Law In re Q.P. Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Stevens v. McGuireWoods L.L.P. Civil Procedure, Corporate Compliance

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Walker v. McGuire Citation: 2015 IL 117138 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law Section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a $50 filing fee in residential mortgage foreclosure cases, two percent of which is retained by the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure complaint is filed,735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 . The circuit court of Will County found section 15-1504.1 violated the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that fee officer prohibition, were aimed at officers who had a direct role in the adjudicative process of the court system, and were compensated for their services through the payment of fees taxed to the litigants. Although clerks of the circuit courts are officers of the judicial branch of government, they are nonjudicial officers. http://j.st/4se5 View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

People v. Fiveash Citation: 2015 IL 117669 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Then 23-year-old Fiveash was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, based on his sexual penetration of the vagina and mouth of his 6-year-old cousin, P.A., in 2003, when he was 14-15 years old. Fiveash was certified to teach grades 6 through 12 and had been teaching part-time at two schools. He moved to dismiss, arguing that the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120) gave the juvenile court “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring prosecution in criminal court, and that he could not be prosecuted in juvenile court because he was over 21. The trial court dismissed, finding the result “unjust, absurd, and clearly unfair to the victim.” The appellate court construed the language in section 5-120 as barring criminal proceedings only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses they allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Because defendant was 23 when indicted, the court concluded section 5-120 did not apply, and reversed and remanded for trial in adult criminal court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 does not bar prosecution in criminal court for offenses allegedly committed when a defendant was 14 or 15 but not charged with until he was over 21 and not subject to the Act. http://j.st/4seS View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

McElwain v. Ill. Sec'y of State Citation: 2015 IL 117170 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law McElwain, was involved in a traffic accident.. The driver and passenger of the motorcycle that hit McElwain's vehicle had substantial injuries; the passenger died. On the date of the accident, plaintiff was neither issued any tickets nor asked to take any chemical tests. During their investigation, police discovered rolling papers and a bag containing a residue that appeared to be cannabis in McElwain’s vehicle, but officers at the scene did not think he appeared to be under the influence of cannabis. Two days later, McElwain was questioned and admitted that he had smoked marijuana two weeks before the accident. The police issued a ticket for failing to yield when turning left and requested that he take a chemical test. The police read him statutory warnings (625 ILCS 5/11-501.6(c). McElwain refused. The Secretary of State suspended his driver’s license for three years. An ALJ upheld the suspension, rejecting an argument that the officers violated due process by waiting too long. The circuit court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied. While the state can condition receipt of a driver’s license on a driver’s agreement to consent to a chemical test if he is involved in a serious motor vehicle accident, the essential nexus between the state’s interest in protecting the public from intoxicated drivers and requiring consent to a chemical test following an arrest related to a serious accident no longer exists when the test is requested two days after the accident. http://j.st/4seT View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Fin. Freedom Acquisition, LLC v. Standard Bank & Trust Co. Citation: 2015 IL 117950 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates, Real Estate & Property Law On October 14, 2010, OneWest Bank sued Standard, as trustee, and unknown trust beneficiaries, to foreclose a “reverse equity” adjustable-rate mortgage on property held by the trust and executed in 2009. Standard filed an answer and counterclaim on July 19, 2011, seeking to rescind the mortgage, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 15 U.S.C. 1601. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Standard was not an “obligor” under TILA and was not entitled to rescind the transaction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The trustee has legal and equitable title to the property and is the only party with an ownership interest in the property since the beneficiary’s interest is in the trust itself and is considered personal property. Standard, was entitled to receive TILA disclosures, including notice of the right to rescind after it entered into the consumer credit transaction. Because TILA disclosures were not provided to Standard, the three-day right to rescind period was extended to three years. Standard timely exercised its right to rescind when it gave notice on June 2, 2011. http://j.st/4seq View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Lake Envtl., Inc. v. Arnold Citation: 2015 IL 118110 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure In 2008 the Illinois Department of Public Health issued a stop-work order issued to Lake Environmental during an asbestos cleanup at Scott Air Force Base.. The Department lifted the stop-work order after several months, but in 2010 removed Lake from the list of state-approved asbestos abatement contractors based on the violations at Scott, which had been remedied. Lake sought judicial review. The trial court held that the Department was barred by res judicata from revoking Lake’s license. Lake then sought sanctions against under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 for bad faith.The trial court denied the motion without explanation. The appellate court concluded that the circuit court erred by failing to provide an explanation and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 imposes no requirement on a circuit court to explain its reasons for denying a motion for sanctions. A record is not inherently insufficient when the circuit court does not provide its reasons for denying the motion. http://j.st/4sec View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan Citation: 2015 IL 118170 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, Public Benefits In December, 2009, Heelan, a Vernon Hills police officer for approximately 20 years, responded to an emergency call, slipped on ice, and fell. He was ultimately diagnosed with significant osteoarthritis in both hips, aggravated by the fall, and had two hip replacement surgeries. He did not return to work. The Village Police Pension Board awarded a line-of-duty disability pension, 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1. The Village sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay Heelan’s health insurance premium under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the Act), 820 ILCS 320/10. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Heelan. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, Proof of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes a catastrophic injury under section 10(a) of the Act as a matter of law; a public safety officer’s employer-sponsored health insurance coverage expires upon the termination of the officer’s employment by the award of the line-of-duty disability pension. The Act lengthens such health insurance coverage beyond the termination of the officer’s employment. http://j.st/4sep View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

O'Toole v. Chicago Zoological Soc'y Citation: 2015 IL 118254 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law In 2010, O’Toole tripped and fell on a paved pathway at Brookfield Zoo and sustained injuries. In 2012, she filed a single-count negligence complaint against the Chicago Zoological Society, alleging that it breached its duty to inspect and maintain the pathway, proximately causing her damages. The Society sought dismissal, arguing that the one-year limitations period of section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a)), rather than the two-year limitations period of section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202), applied and time-barred O’Toole’s complaint. The trial court dismissed, finding that the Society fell under the Act’s definition of “[l]ocal public entity” as a “not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business.” The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the Society conceded that it was not a department or agency of any government; that it received less than half of its funding from tax proceeds; that its employees were not appointed or paid by the Forest Preserve District and were not covered by any public pension or workers compensation funds; and that the vast majority of its trustees were not District officials. http://j.st/4seG View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155 Citation: 2015 IL 118332 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. http://j.st/4seN View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

People v. Goossens Citation: 2015 IL 118347 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law Goossens, a police sergeant, was convicted of intimidation, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(6)), after he threatened not to respond to 911 calls from a local auto racetrack as long as two former police officers were employed at the facility. He was sentenced to a term of two years’ probation. The probation order contained numerous conditions, one of which required that Gossens “shall become current in his child support in case number 2002 D 528.” He appealed, arguing the trial court lacked the authority under section 5-6-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to include the payment of child support as a condition of probation, 730 ILCS - 2 - 5/5-6-3(b). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The defense’s attempted construction contradicted prior interpretation of the plain language of the Code, which says, “[t]he Court may ... require that the person ... support his dependents.” http://j.st/4sex View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Seymour v. Collins Citation: 2015 IL 118432 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Injury Law In 2008 the Seymours filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. In 2010 the Seymours filed a personal injury action, based on a 2010 automobile accident that occurred while Seymour was being transported in an ambulance. A 2010 plan modification entailed a reduction in the Seymours’s monthly payment amount based on an allegation that Seymour was unable to work and was only receiving workers’ compensation payments. The Seymours never apprised the bankruptcy court that their circumstances had changed after the 2010 modification. Defendants in the injury action successfully obtained summary judgment, based on estoppel because the Seymours failed to disclose their personal injury action in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed,The fact that the Seymours had a legal duty to disclose this suit and failed to do so does not establish intent to deceive or manipulate the bankruptcy court. The 2010 motion to modify the bankruptcy plan did not evince their awareness of the need to disclose the personal injury cause of action. http://j.st/4sef View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

In re Q.P. Citation: 2015 IL 118569 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . http://j.st/4seY View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Stevens v. McGuireWoods L.L.P. Citation: 2015 IL 118652 Opinion Date: September 24, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Corporate Compliance In 2005, plaintiffs, former Beeland minority shareholders, hired the McGuireWoods law firm to sue Beeland’s managers and majority shareholder, alleging misappropriation of Beeland’s intellectual property. Plaintiffs brought these claims in their individual capacities and derivatively on behalf of Beeland. In 2008, the court dismissed several claims without prejudice all claims. Plaintiffs’ new counsel obtained leave to amend and added counts against Beeland’s corporate counsel, Sidley Austin. The court dismissed all claims against Sidley as untimely and dismissed all individual claims against Sidley on the grounds plaintiffs lacked standing in their individual capacities. In 2011, plaintiffs settled with Rogers; relinquished their ownership interests in Beeland, and, in their individual capacities, sued McGuireWoods for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to timely assert obvious claims against Sidley. The court granted McGuireWoods summary judgment. The appellate court noted that in the underlying action the court never ruled on the merits of derivative claims against Sidley and remanded for a determination as to whether plaintiffs would have been successful in a derivative but for failure to add Sidley in a timely manner. The Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs are bound by the trial court’s determination in the underlying case that they had no standing to bring individual claims against Sidley; even assuming they were successful, plaintiffs could not have collected personally on any judgment against Sidley on the derivative claims. McGuireWoods’s failure to assert claims against Sidley in a timely manner caused no injury to plaintiffs in their individual capacities, which is the only capacity in which they are proceeding. http://j.st/4seA View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Supreme Court of Illinois

Daily Opinion Summaries

Summaries for April 17, 2015 People v. Barner Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

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People v. Barner Citation: 2015 IL 116949 Opinion Date: April 16, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Barner was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1)) and sentenced to natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v. Williams (2010). The appellate court again affirmed. That decision was vacated by a new supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider in light of People v. Leach (2012). The appellate court again affirmed. The IllinoisSupreme Court affirmed, finding that Barner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated when three state witnesses were allowed to testify concerning the DNA laboratory work and conclusions of nontestifying scientists. None of the documents at issue took the form of an affidavit, attestation, certification, sworn statement, or formal declaration; they lacked the “formality and solemnity” necessary for a statement to be testimonial. The court noted that Barner presented no evidence and did not impeach the state’s witnesses in any significant way, so that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The main focus at trial did not concern the identification of the attacker, but was the victim’s credibility and her account of the assault. http://j.st/4dXA View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Citation: 2015 IL 117418 Opinion Date: April 16, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. TheIllinois Supreme Court affirmed. http://j.st/4dXQ View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Leetaru v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. Citation: 2015 IL 117485 Opinion Date: April 16, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law Leetaru, a graduate student at and former employee of the University of Illinois, sought to enjoin the University from taking further action in an investigation of him, as a student, regarding allegations that he violated the University’s “Policy and Procedures on Academic Integrity in Research and Publication.” Leetaru alleged that the defendants failed to comply with the University’s rules and regulations governing student discipline and that their actions exceeded their lawful authority, were arbitrary, resulted in a gross injustice, and deprived him of due process. The circuit court dismissed, finding that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, citing the right to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct by the state, its agencies, boards, departments, commissions and agents, or to compel their compliance with legal or constitutional requirements, which includes actions to require compliance with administrative rules and regulations. Leetaru’s claims may proceed in circuit court without offending principles of sovereign immunity. Leetaru does not question the right of defendants to investigate research misconduct, but only claims that in investigating misconduct, defendants are obligated to adhere to policies and procedures promulgated by the University and that they have failed to do so. http://j.st/4dXM View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Supreme Court of Illinois

Summaries for March 20, 2015 Skaperdas v. Country Cas. Ins. Co. Insurance Law, Injury Law Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc. Environmental Law Harris v. One Hope United, Inc. Civil Procedure, Injury Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Brunton v. Kruger Trusts & Estates, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Cowper v. Nyberg Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Injury Law In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D. Civil Procedure, Family Law McCormick v. Robertson Civil Procedure, Family Law

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Skaperdas v. Country Cas. Ins. Co. Citation: 2015 IL 117021 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Injury Law Country Casualty's agent Lessaris, issued an automobile insurance policy to Skaperdas. Skaperdas’s fiancée, Day, was subsequently involved in an accident while driving his vehicle. Country Casualty covered the loss but required Skaperdas to change his policy to include Day. Lessaris prepared the policy, but identified only Skaperdas, not Day, as a named insured. The policy's declarations page identified the driver as a “female, 30-64.” Following issuance of the policy, Day’s minor son, Jackson, was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle and seriously injured. The driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Jackson’s medical expenses. Plaintiffs made a demand for underinsured motorist coverage under the Country Casualty policy. Country Casualty denied the claim on the ground that neither Day nor Jackson was listed as a named insured. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Lessaris breached his duty to exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding, and placing insurance coverage as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-2201, and that Country Casualty was responsible for the acts of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They also sought reformation of contract to include Day as an additional named insured and a declaration of coverage. The trial court dismissed the negligence and respondeat superior counts. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Code does impose a duty of ordinary care. http://j.st/4AtJ View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc. Citation: 2015 IL 117193 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Environmental Law In July 2000, the Illinois Attorney General, on his own motion and at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), filed a complaint against JTE and Tri-State, alleging operation of a solid waste disposal site on 40 acres in Lynwood that had operated as a sand pit, without a permit, in violation of the Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1. The underlying individual owners were later added to the suit. The site was operational from 1995 until 2003. After several years of litigation, the circuit court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that defendants had violated the Act by engaging in open dumping and by permitting the deposit of construction and demolition debris waste above grade without a permit. Monetary penalties were imposed on each defendant. The court also ordered defendants to remove any and all material deposited above grade at the site. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to liability, but vacated the injunction, finding that section 42(e) of the Act may not be applied retroactively in this case. At the time the site was operational, the only injunctive relief available was prohibitory, that is, the restraint of future violations. http://j.st/4Ato View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Harris v. One Hope United, Inc. Citation: 2015 IL 117200 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Injury Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.” http://j.st/4At4 View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Brunton v. Kruger Citation: 2015 IL 117663 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Brunton sued her brother, Kruger, as trustee of the trusts established by their late parents and as representative of their estates, and individual family members. Brunton, who was not named a beneficiary of the trusts, alleged undue influence and her mother’s diminished capacity. The elder Krugers had consulted with an accounting firm (Striegel) for estate planning. They provided Striegel with confidential information about their family, income, assets, and goals. Striegel provided information to the attorney who prepared the Krugers’ trust documents and wills. Brunton and the Estates issued subpoenas seeking discovery of the information and documents. A CPA at Striegel complied with the Estates’ subpoenas, but did not provide the documents to Brunton. Striegel invoked the Illinois Public Accounting Act (225 ILCS 450/27), governing confidentiality of records. The circuit court ordered Striegel to produce tax documents, but held that the estate planning documents were privileged. Brunton then issued deposition subpoenas to a Striegel CPA and a non-CPA employee, seeking production of the estate planning documents. The court again found the estate planning documents privileged, but held that Striegel had waived the privilege by providing the documents to the representative of the Estates. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The privilege belongs to the accountant, not the client, and there is no testamentary exception to the privilege, but the accountant waived the privilege by disclosing information to one party. He cannot claim the privilege to avoid disclosure of the same information to the other party. http://j.st/4AtZ View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

Cowper v. Nyberg Citation: 2015 IL 117811 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Injury Law Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff. http://j.st/4Atk View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D. Citation: 2015 IL 117904 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law In 1999, Maria and Jim began living together. During a 2003 trip to Slovakia to visit family, Maria met Scarlett, an orphan born in 1999. Under Slovakian law, Jim was not permitted to adopt Scarlett because he was neither a Slovakian national nor married to Maria. Maria commenced the year-long adoption process and lived in Slovakia during that time. Jim financially supported the process, traveled there five times, and participated in a psychological evaluation. In 2004, Maria adopted Scarlett under Slovakian law, and the three returned to Elmhurst, Illinois. Scarlett used the hyphenated form of their last names. Scarlett referred to Jim as “daddy.” Jim’s name appears in Scarlett’s school records as Scarlett’s father. Jim paid all family expenses; he established a $500,000 irrevocable trust for Scarlett. In 2008, Maria moved out of Jim’s home, taking Scarlett. Jim sought a declaration of parental rights. Jim also alleged common law contract claims. The circuit court dismissed Jim’s common law claims and concluded that Jim lacked standing and was not subject to paying child support. The appellate court reversed, holding that the equitable adoption doctrine might present a potentially viable theory of standing , but affirmed the dismissal of Jim’s contract claims. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable adoption, previously recognized in a will contest, does not apply to child custody proceedings. http://j.st/4AFv View Case On: Justia Google Scholar

McCormick v. Robertson Citation: 2015 IL 118230 Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law A brief relationship between mother, a Missouri resident, and father, an Illinois resident, resulted in a child, L.M., born in Missouri in 2009. In 2010, father sought to establish the existence of a father-child relationship and to obtain joint custody under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1), which allows parentage actions to be brought in the county in which any party resides. Mother filed an appearance. Both attended the hearing and stated that they had entered into a joint parenting agreement. The court entered its judgment, incorporating the agreement, in which they submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction. Father began a military tour of duty. Upon leaving the service in 2012, he was able to visit L.M. frequently in Missouri. In November 2012, mother moved to Las Vegas, taking L.M. Father sought custody. Mother filed suit in Nevada, asserting that the Illinois judgment was void due to lack of Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (750 ILCS 36/101] subject matter jurisdiction. At her request, the Champaign County circuit court vacated its 2010 order and dismissed father’s complaint. The appellate court vacated, holding that compliance with the statute was not a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. As used in the statute, “jurisdiction” is a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of its inherent authority. Determination of who should have custody of L.M. presented a justiciable matter that fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Once a court has subject matter jurisdiction, its judgment will not be rendered void merely because of an error in its determination of the facts or application of the law. http://j.st/4AFy View Case On: Justia Google Scholar