Summaries for March 20, 2015
- Skaperdas v. Country Cas. Ins. Co.
Insurance Law, Injury Law
- Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc.
Environmental Law
- Harris v. One Hope United, Inc.
Civil Procedure, Injury Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
- Brunton v. Kruger
Trusts & Estates, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
- Cowper v. Nyberg
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Injury Law
- In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D.
Civil Procedure, Family Law
- McCormick v. Robertson
Civil Procedure, Family Law
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117021 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Injury Law |
Country Casualty's agent Lessaris, issued an automobile insurance policy to Skaperdas. Skaperdas’s fiancée, Day, was subsequently involved in an accident while driving his vehicle. Country Casualty covered the loss but required Skaperdas to change his policy to include Day. Lessaris prepared the policy, but identified only Skaperdas, not Day, as a named insured. The policy's declarations page identified the driver as a “female, 30-64.” Following issuance of the policy, Day’s minor son, Jackson, was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle and seriously injured. The driver’s insurance was insufficient to cover Jackson’s medical expenses. Plaintiffs made a demand for underinsured motorist coverage under the Country Casualty policy. Country Casualty denied the claim on the ground that neither Day nor Jackson was listed as a named insured. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Lessaris breached his duty to exercise ordinary care and skill in renewing, procuring, binding, and placing insurance coverage as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-2201, and that Country Casualty was responsible for the acts of its agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They also sought reformation of contract to include Day as an additional named insured and a declaration of coverage. The trial court dismissed the negligence and respondeat superior counts. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Code does impose a duty of ordinary care.
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117193 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Environmental Law |
In July 2000, the Illinois Attorney General, on his own motion and at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), filed a complaint against JTE and Tri-State, alleging operation of a solid waste disposal site on 40 acres in Lynwood that had operated as a sand pit, without a permit, in violation of the Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1. The underlying individual owners were later added to the suit. The site was operational from 1995 until 2003. After several years of litigation, the circuit court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that defendants had violated the Act by engaging in open dumping and by permitting the deposit of construction and demolition debris waste above grade without a permit. Monetary penalties were imposed on each defendant. The court also ordered defendants to remove any and all material deposited above grade at the site. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to liability, but vacated the injunction, finding that section 42(e) of the Act may not be applied retroactively in this case. At the time the site was operational, the only injunctive relief available was prohibitory, that is, the restraint of future violations.
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117200 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Injury Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.”
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117663 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
Brunton sued her brother, Kruger, as trustee of the trusts established by their late parents and as representative of their estates, and individual family members. Brunton, who was not named a beneficiary of the trusts, alleged undue influence and her mother’s diminished capacity. The elder Krugers had consulted with an accounting firm (Striegel) for estate planning. They provided Striegel with confidential information about their family, income, assets, and goals. Striegel provided information to the attorney who prepared the Krugers’ trust documents and wills. Brunton and the Estates issued subpoenas seeking discovery of the information and documents. A CPA at Striegel complied with the Estates’ subpoenas, but did not provide the documents to Brunton. Striegel invoked the Illinois Public Accounting Act (225 ILCS 450/27), governing confidentiality of records. The circuit court ordered Striegel to produce tax documents, but held that the estate planning documents were privileged. Brunton then issued deposition subpoenas to a Striegel CPA and a non-CPA employee, seeking production of the estate planning documents. The court again found the estate planning documents privileged, but held that Striegel had waived the privilege by providing the documents to the representative of the Estates. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The privilege belongs to the accountant, not the client, and there is no testamentary exception to the privilege, but the accountant waived the privilege by disclosing information to one party. He cannot claim the privilege to avoid disclosure of the same information to the other party.
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117811 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Injury Law |
Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff.
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| Citation: 2015 IL 117904 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law |
In 1999, Maria and Jim began living together. During a 2003 trip to Slovakia to visit family, Maria met Scarlett, an orphan born in 1999. Under Slovakian law, Jim was not permitted to adopt Scarlett because he was neither a Slovakian national nor married to Maria. Maria commenced the year-long adoption process and lived in Slovakia during that time. Jim financially supported the process, traveled there five times, and participated in a psychological evaluation. In 2004, Maria adopted Scarlett under Slovakian law, and the three returned to Elmhurst, Illinois. Scarlett used the hyphenated form of their last names. Scarlett referred to Jim as “daddy.” Jim’s name appears in Scarlett’s school records as Scarlett’s father. Jim paid all family expenses; he established a $500,000 irrevocable trust for Scarlett. In 2008, Maria moved out of Jim’s home, taking Scarlett. Jim sought a declaration of parental rights. Jim also alleged common law contract claims. The circuit court dismissed Jim’s common law claims and concluded that Jim lacked standing and was not subject to paying child support. The appellate court reversed, holding that the equitable adoption doctrine might present a potentially viable theory of standing , but affirmed the dismissal of Jim’s contract claims. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine of equitable adoption, previously recognized in a will contest, does not apply to child custody proceedings.
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| Citation: 2015 IL 118230 | Opinion Date: March 19, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law |
A brief relationship between mother, a Missouri resident, and father, an Illinois resident, resulted in a child, L.M., born in Missouri in 2009. In 2010, father sought to establish the existence of a father-child relationship and to obtain joint custody under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1), which allows parentage actions to be brought in the county in which any party resides. Mother filed an appearance. Both attended the hearing and stated that they had entered into a joint parenting agreement. The court entered its judgment, incorporating the agreement, in which they submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction. Father began a military tour of duty. Upon leaving the service in 2012, he was able to visit L.M. frequently in Missouri. In November 2012, mother moved to Las Vegas, taking L.M. Father sought custody. Mother filed suit in Nevada, asserting that the Illinois judgment was void due to lack of Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (750 ILCS 36/101] subject matter jurisdiction. At her request, the Champaign County circuit court vacated its 2010 order and dismissed father’s complaint. The appellate court vacated, holding that compliance with the statute was not a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. As used in the statute, “jurisdiction” is a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters, not a precondition to the exercise of its inherent authority. Determination of who should have custody of L.M. presented a justiciable matter that fell within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Once a court has subject matter jurisdiction, its judgment will not be rendered void merely because of an error in its determination of the facts or application of the law.
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