| Docket: 12-1229 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Wood |
| Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
Aljabri, born in Jordan, married a U.S. citizen in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2003, he sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1430. USCIS conducted an interview and then delayed for nine years. In 2007 Aljabri was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring transactions not to trigger financial institution reporting requirements. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In 2008 DHS alleged that Aljabri was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of a crime causing victims a loss of more than $10,000. He was ordered removed in absentia. He filed suit, asking the district court either to naturalize him or declare him a U.S. citizen based on the still-pending 2003 application. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction and dismissed in January, 2012. On May 3, 2012, USCIS denied the naturalization petition, stating that the final order of removal meant that he was no longer a lawful permanent resident and only permanent residents can be naturalized and that Aljabri could not demonstrate the good moral character necessary for naturalization. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the naturalization application until the matter is remanded to the agency.
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| Docket: 12-1747 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Kanne |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim.
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| Docket: 12-3415 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Bauer |
| Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Transportation Law |
The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.”
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| Docket: 12-3901 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Rovner |
| Areas of Law: Injury Law, Insurance Law |
Golden purchased automobile insurance from State Farm. The mandatory liability portion of her policy provided that State Farm would defend the insured against a third-party lawsuit using attorneys chosen by State Farm. Following a collision, Golden was represented by in-house counsel. She later filed a purported class action, claiming that “historically and traditionally” State Farm and other insurers defended third-party claims against insureds by hiring private, independent attorneys. State Farm now routinely uses in-house staff attorneys to represent insureds against such claims. Golden filed a purported class action, alleging that State Farm owes its insureds a duty to explain in its policies that house counsel may be used. The district court dismissed, holding that Indiana law creates no obligation to provide advance notification to an insured that an insurer uses house counsel to defend insureds. The court denied Golden’s request to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Golden did not allege that she received deficient representation or that she ever objected to the use of house counsel in her suit. All of her claims depended on the existence of a duty to disclose; State Farm had no duty to disclose.
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| Docket: 13-1899 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Kanne |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law |
Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants.
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| Docket: 12-3504 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Wood |
| Areas of Law: Class Action, Consumer Law |
McMahon apparently did not pay a 1997 utility bill. In 2011, LVNV purchased the debt, then $584.98. LVNV retained a collection agency, Tate, which sent a letter that said nothing about when the debt was incurred or the four-year Illinois statute of limitations. The district court dismissed McMahon’s classwide allegations, but did not dismiss his individual claim. McMahon ignored two settlement offers. The court found that the proposed settlement offered McMahon complete recovery for his individual claim, that it was made prior to class certification, and that it had the effect of depriving McMahon of a personal stake in the litigation. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals and held that, in some circumstances, a dunning letter for a time‐barred debt could mislead an unsophisticated consumer to believe that the debt is enforceable in court, and thereby violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The court also held that the McMahon case is not moot.
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| Docket: 13-2602 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Kanne |
| Areas of Law: Public Benefits |
Thomas sought disability benefits in 2009, based on sciatica, diabetes, angina, a trigger thumb in her left hand, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She was morbidly obese. Thomas saw a consultative examiner, who noted a reduced range of motion in Thomas’s lumbar spine, hips, and knees; an x-ray appeared to show narrowed disc space. A state agency doctor determined that Thomas had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. At a hearing, Thomas testified that she could not stand for more than 15 minutes or sit for more than 20 minutes at a time and could only walk about half a block and could not do laundry or vacuum. When the inflammation was bad, she could not use her left hand at all. Thomas used her inhaler four times a day to control asthma. A vocational expert testified about Thomas’s prior work as a phlebotomist as heavy, semiskilled work, requiring lifting and moving patients and drawing their blood. The ALJ denied Thomas’s claim. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ improperly discredited Thomas’s testimony and disregarded medical evidence concerning pain.
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| Docket: 13-1335 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Posner |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
While at Big Muddy, inmate Roberts broke his hand in a fight. He claims that he received inadequate treatment and that he filed an “emergency” grievance and received no response. Defendants claim there was no grievance. He was transferred to Pinckneyville. He says he told the receiving officer (Alvis) that Big Muddy staff had authorized him to be assigned to the bottom bunk, but that Alvis said to work it out with his cellmate. He claims to have filed a grievance, but Pinckneyville officials deny receiving it. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Roberts forfeited claims against Alvis; his grievance neither mentioned a name nor provided information that should have identified Alvis. Dismissal of the hand-injury claim was too abrupt, absent inquiry into what Roberts could reasonably know about how to proceed against a prison employee in a different prison through the Administrative Review Board, but that grievance was also defective. Regarding other Big Muddy defendants, it was unclear whether Roberts’s emergency grievance, which would bypass normal procedures, was in records that were searched, so the untimely filing with the Review Board is irrelevant. If the defendants want to contest whether the grievance was filed, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary.
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| Docket: 13-2131 | Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 |
| Judge: Flaum |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Deputy Stanley pulled over Hille for an expired vehicle registration sticker. The Secretary of State’s record was different than the date on the sticker. Stanley was unable to resolve the discrepancy at that time and let Hille go. The Secretary of State’s office later notified her that the sticker was stolen. Possession of a stolen sticker is a felony in Illinois. Stanley proceeded to Hille’s registered address to arrest her, arranging for Deputy Morrison to meet her there. The deputies knocked on the door. Iit was answered by White, Hille’s boyfriend, who owned and lived in the house. White refused to allow them entry without a warrant. Stanley and Morrison claim to have smelled burning marijuana from inside the house. Hille had been smoking marijuana and was later found in the house with a half‐burned joint. White attempted to close the door and retreated into the house and up the stairs. Stanley blocked the door. The deputies tackled him on the stairs. Morrison forced White’s arm behind his back and told White to stop resisting. White claims to have suffered a shoulder injury. The deputies arrested White for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a charge later dismissed. White filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, claiming false arrest and excessive force. The court found that there was no exigency and that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting “fractured case law” concerning entry after smelling marijuana.
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