Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Aljabri v. Holder Docket: 12-1229 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law Aljabri, born in Jordan, married a U.S. citizen in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2003, he sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1430. USCIS conducted an interview and then delayed for nine years. In 2007 Aljabri was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring transactions not to trigger financial institution reporting requirements. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In 2008 DHS alleged that Aljabri was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of a crime causing victims a loss of more than $10,000. He was ordered removed in absentia. He filed suit, asking the district court either to naturalize him or declare him a U.S. citizen based on the still-pending 2003 application. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction and dismissed in January, 2012. On May 3, 2012, USCIS denied the naturalization petition, stating that the final order of removal meant that he was no longer a lawful permanent resident and only permanent residents can be naturalized and that Aljabri could not demonstrate the good moral character necessary for naturalization. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the naturalization application until the matter is remanded to the agency. http://j.st/ZZnx View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Richardson v. Hardy Docket: 12-1747 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Kanne Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim. http://j.st/ZZnp View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. Docket: 12-3415 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Bauer Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Transportation Law The Brotherhood represents Norfolk employees who work to ensure that railways remain clear, safe, and navigable. The collective bargaining agreements entitle Brotherhood members to an investigation before Norfolk takes disciplinary action. Norfolk fired four Brotherhood members for making false statements about injuries they suffered while on duty. The investigation followed the procedures typical of a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. As part of the investigation before the firing, Norfolk submitted reports from a consulting engineer, but the engineer did not testify. The Brotherhood sought an injunction to ban the use of accident reconstruction reports in employee disciplinary investigations unless Norfolk adheres to additional pre-hearing procedures. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dispute arose from application of the collective bargaining agreement in employee disciplinary actions. Norfolk met its burden of proving that its use of the disputed reports at investigations was justified by a contractual right, albeit an implied one. The suit is a “quintessential” minor dispute under the Act and there is “no basis for asserting jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute.” http://j.st/ZZeC View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Golden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Docket: 12-3901 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Rovner Areas of Law: Injury Law, Insurance Law Golden purchased automobile insurance from State Farm. The mandatory liability portion of her policy provided that State Farm would defend the insured against a third-party lawsuit using attorneys chosen by State Farm. Following a collision, Golden was represented by in-house counsel. She later filed a purported class action, claiming that “historically and traditionally” State Farm and other insurers defended third-party claims against insureds by hiring private, independent attorneys. State Farm now routinely uses in-house staff attorneys to represent insureds against such claims. Golden filed a purported class action, alleging that State Farm owes its insureds a duty to explain in its policies that house counsel may be used. The district court dismissed, holding that Indiana law creates no obligation to provide advance notification to an insured that an insurer uses house counsel to defend insureds. The court denied Golden’s request to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Golden did not allege that she received deficient representation or that she ever objected to the use of house counsel in her suit. All of her claims depended on the existence of a duty to disclose; State Farm had no duty to disclose. http://j.st/ZZez View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Snyder v. King Docket: 13-1899 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Kanne Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. http://j.st/ZZen View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC Docket: 12-3504 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Wood Areas of Law: Class Action, Consumer Law McMahon apparently did not pay a 1997 utility bill. In 2011, LVNV purchased the debt, then $584.98. LVNV retained a collection agency, Tate, which sent a letter that said nothing about when the debt was incurred or the four-year Illinois statute of limitations. The district court dismissed McMahon’s classwide allegations, but did not dismiss his individual claim. McMahon ignored two settlement offers. The court found that the proposed settlement offered McMahon complete recovery for his individual claim, that it was made prior to class certification, and that it had the effect of depriving McMahon of a personal stake in the litigation. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals and held that, in some circumstances, a dunning letter for a time‐barred debt could mislead an unsophisticated consumer to believe that the debt is enforceable in court, and thereby violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The court also held that the McMahon case is not moot. http://j.st/ZZes View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Thomas v. Colvin Docket: 13-2602 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Kanne Areas of Law: Public Benefits Thomas sought disability benefits in 2009, based on sciatica, diabetes, angina, a trigger thumb in her left hand, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She was morbidly obese. Thomas saw a consultative examiner, who noted a reduced range of motion in Thomas’s lumbar spine, hips, and knees; an x-ray appeared to show narrowed disc space. A state agency doctor determined that Thomas had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. At a hearing, Thomas testified that she could not stand for more than 15 minutes or sit for more than 20 minutes at a time and could only walk about half a block and could not do laundry or vacuum. When the inflammation was bad, she could not use her left hand at all. Thomas used her inhaler four times a day to control asthma. A vocational expert testified about Thomas’s prior work as a phlebotomist as heavy, semiskilled work, requiring lifting and moving patients and drawing their blood. The ALJ denied Thomas’s claim. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ improperly discredited Thomas’s testimony and disregarded medical evidence concerning pain. http://j.st/ZZeP View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Roberts v. Neal Docket: 13-1335 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Posner Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law While at Big Muddy, inmate Roberts broke his hand in a fight. He claims that he received inadequate treatment and that he filed an “emergency” grievance and received no response. Defendants claim there was no grievance. He was transferred to Pinckneyville. He says he told the receiving officer (Alvis) that Big Muddy staff had authorized him to be assigned to the bottom bunk, but that Alvis said to work it out with his cellmate. He claims to have filed a grievance, but Pinckneyville officials deny receiving it. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Roberts forfeited claims against Alvis; his grievance neither mentioned a name nor provided information that should have identified Alvis. Dismissal of the hand-injury claim was too abrupt, absent inquiry into what Roberts could reasonably know about how to proceed against a prison employee in a different prison through the Administrative Review Board, but that grievance was also defective. Regarding other Big Muddy defendants, it was unclear whether Roberts’s emergency grievance, which would bypass normal procedures, was in records that were searched, so the untimely filing with the Review Board is irrelevant. If the defendants want to contest whether the grievance was filed, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. http://j.st/ZZeM View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

White v. Stanley Docket: 13-2131 Opinion Date: March 11, 2014 Judge: Flaum Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Deputy Stanley pulled over Hille for an expired vehicle registration sticker. The Secretary of State’s record was different than the date on the sticker. Stanley was unable to resolve the discrepancy at that time and let Hille go. The Secretary of State’s office later notified her that the sticker was stolen. Possession of a stolen sticker is a felony in Illinois. Stanley proceeded to Hille’s registered address to arrest her, arranging for Deputy Morrison to meet her there. The deputies knocked on the door. Iit was answered by White, Hille’s boyfriend, who owned and lived in the house. White refused to allow them entry without a warrant. Stanley and Morrison claim to have smelled burning marijuana from inside the house. Hille had been smoking marijuana and was later found in the house with a half‐burned joint. White attempted to close the door and retreated into the house and up the stairs. Stanley blocked the door. The deputies tackled him on the stairs. Morrison forced White’s arm behind his back and told White to stop resisting. White claims to have suffered a shoulder injury. The deputies arrested White for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a charge later dismissed. White filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, claiming false arrest and excessive force. The court found that there was no exigency and that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting “fractured case law” concerning entry after smelling marijuana. http://j.st/ZZeT View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Buechel v. United States Docket: 13-2278 Opinion Date: March 7, 2014 Judge: Hamilton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Health Law, Injury Law In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies. http://j.st/ZZQJ View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar

United States v. Hallahan Docket: 12-3787 Opinion Date: March 7, 2014 Judge: Griesback Areas of Law: Criminal Law From 1993-1999 the Hallahans ran a fraudulent scheme that bilked investors out of more than $1,000,000. In 2000, they pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341 & 1344, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), in exchange for dismissal of other charges and recommendation of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and of a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. The plea agreements included appeal waivers. They did not appear for sentencing. They were finally arrested in 2012. They pled guilty to willfully failing to appear for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) and argued that the court should use the version of the U.S.S.G. in effect at the time of the offenses, rather than the version in effect at the time of sentencing. The district court calculated the sentencing range using the 2012 Guidelines, arriving at an advisory range of 210 to 262 months for Nelson and 135 to 168 months for Janet. Under the 1998 Guidelines, the range would have been 121 to 151 months for Nelson and 97 to 121 months for Janet. The court imposed a sentence of 270 months on Nelson and 195 months on Janet based after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. http://j.st/ZZQ4 View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Staph infections are nothing. Over 50% of prisoners in many institutions are HIV positive or already have active AIDS. And it's exactly what they deserve - but what happens when these infectious persons are let free to enter once more into society?

The Bishops Versus Women’s Health: The Gloves Are Off

With Pope Francis having been named Time Magazine’s Person of the Year, the United States Catholic Bishops, to be sure, will sing his praises to the press, but at the same time, they cannot be pleased that this is likely to re-energize the circulation of Francis’s statement that some bishops have been “obsessed” with their political war against abortion and gay rights, when there are other more important issues to address, such as dire poverty. Nor can it be comforting for the Bishops to have such a spotlight thrown on the man who is encouraging the Church to be more inclusive and loving when their own modus operandi is, well, rather different. We are, make no mistake about it, in the midst of a war over whether the Bishops and those who agree with them, or individual women themselves, will control women’s bodies and health. - See more at: 

http://verdict.justia.com/2013/12/12/bishops-versus-womens-health-gloves#sthash.kNDHIllE.dpuf

7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Bates v. Astrue

Docket: 12-3359	Opinion Date: December 2, 2013
Judge: Kanne
Areas of Law:

Bates has suffered from radiating neck pain since 2004, when a truck struck her car. Since then, she has continued to care for her six adopted children and dealt with the loss of her fiancé and her mother. As a result of the stress, Bates sought psychological and psychiatric treatment. She sought Supplemental Security Income. After her application was denied, Bates requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ denied her application; the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for rehearing, finding that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Bates’s treating psychiatrist and improperly evaluated Bates’s testimony concerning her mental health.

http://j.st/FNc
View Case On: Justia  Google Scholar