| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
Han v. United Continental Holdings, et al.
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against United, alleging that United breached the terms of its frequent-flyer program. Plaintiff argued that United breached the program contract by crediting him for mileage determined by the distance between the airports, instead of the number of miles the airplanes actually flew (including such things as weather diversions and landing delays). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of the program because United has discretion to interpret the meaning of "mileage" and the interpretation United gave that term was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.
| ||||||||||
Mathews, Jr. v. Rio
Petitioner, convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and one of the predicate state felony convictions upon which the district court relied was a federal conviction under Illinois's felon-in-possession statute. The court concluded that the petition was blocked by 28 U.S.C. 2255(e), which restricts a prisoner from applying for habeas review where a prisoner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion already has been denied and that motion was not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Petitioner presented the same argument that he made to the initial sentencing court - the court misconstrued the text of the Illinois statute, to this court on appeal, and to the district court in his motion for relief under section 2255. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
| ||||||||||
Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC
The Union filed suit against a nuclear energy facility to compel arbitration after a union employee was discharged without just cause. The court reversed the district court's denial of the Union's motion to compel arbitration where the Union's grievance, on its face, clearly falls within the scope of the arbitration clause.
| ||||||||||
Hill v. United States
Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., after he was attacked by a fellow prisoner which resulted in blindness in one eye and serious impairment in the other eye. Plaintiff was released from prison while his suit was pending and failed to notify the court of his new address. Consequently, the suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff, through counsel, later sought to set aside the dismissal twice and the district court denied his motion both times. Given the unusual gravity of plaintiff's injuries, the absence of any suggestion of prejudice to defendant from the delay in suing, and the district court's cursory treatment of the issue of equitable tolling, the court vacated and remanded to the district court for further consideration of the tolling issue.
| ||||||||||
Mosley v. Butler
The State appealed for the second time the district court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. On remand, the district court held that petitioner's trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington and granted the petition. The State appealed, arguing that the district court analyzed the state court's decision under section 2254(d), instead of analyzing independently whether petitioner was being held unconstitutionally under section 2254(a). The court concluded that, although the district court used incorrect language to describe its job on remand, it recognized its duty to correctly review petitioner's claim under section 2254(a). The court agreed with the district court's assessment that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights and affirmed the district court's order to release or retry petitioner.
| ||||||||||
Lindner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Union Pacific in state court after his parents were killed when a Union Pacific train derailed and caused a bridge to collapse. Union Pacific removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction where plaintiff's parents were domiciled in Illinois and Union Pacific is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska. On appeal, Union Pacific challenged the district court's grant of plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint to add claims against two Illinois residents. The court held that, because the order granting leave to amend can be reviewed in state court, mandamus relief is neither necessary nor appropriate. In this instance, Union Pacific's appeal and request for a writ of mandamus must be dismissed.
| ||||||||||
Marshall v. City of Chicago, et al.
Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and law enforcement officers, alleging that plaintiff's arrest was not supported by probable cause. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to excuse a prospective juror for cause on the grounds that she held a prior belief concerning the possession of firearms by convicted felons, which plaintiff believed made her unfit to serve. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred by refusing to agree to an ad hoc alteration of the parties' agreed-upon jury selection procedures for the express purpose of ensuring that the petit jury would include jurors of a certain race. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the prospective juror for cause, nor did it do so by denying plaintiff's motion to adjust the agreed-upon size of the petit jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
| ||||||||||
Illinois Social Media Law, Conservative News, Chicago & National Politics
Vote Trump 2016 !
Trump 2016
Showing posts with label 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Friday, August 08, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Daily Opinion SummariesU.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals | ||||||||||
Summaries for August 8, 2014
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
Estate of Edmund M. Carman v. Tinkes, et al.
Edmund Carman died after crashing his car into the back of a commercial pickup truck. His estate filed suit alleging state negligence claims in federal district court against the truck's driver (Daniel Tinkes), the driver's employer, and the truck's owner, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants where a jury could find that Tinkes had illegally passed the other truck on the right but that a jury could not find that Tinkes's violation caused Carman to crash into his truck from the rear in the lane that Tinkes was leaving.
| ||||||||||
Malin v. Hospira, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that her employer and several managers retaliated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court rejected the idea that the passage of a particular amount of time between protected activity and retaliation can bar the claim as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff has offered evidence of other retaliatory behavior between her 2003 sexual harassment complaint and the 2006 reorganizations and demotion that bridged the gap between the two events, leaving the issues of causation for a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial.
| ||||||||||
CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1 v. Town of Glenmore
CEnergy filed suit against Glenmore claiming a denial of its right under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive due process and a violation of the town's state law obligation to deal in good faith. While CEnergy obtained a conditional use permit from Glenmore to develop a wind farm, the company failed to obtain required building permits in time to take advantage of a lucrative opportunity to sell electricity generated by wind turbines to a Wisconsin power company. The court concluded that the town board's decision to delay action on CEnergy's building permit requests could not have been arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Even if the board's treatment of the building permit applications had been arbitrary in the constitutional sense, CEnergy still would have failed to state a substantive due process claim where a plaintiff who ignores potential state law remedies cannot state a substantive due process claim based on a state-created property right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
| ||||||||||
Tuesday, August 05, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Summaries for August 5, 2014
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
Light v. Caraway
In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Boley v. Colvin
Boley sought Social Security disability benefits. The agency denied her request initially and on reconsideration. A person dissatisfied with such a decision has 60 days to request a hearing. Boley took about nine months because SSA had notified Boley but not her lawyer (as required by 20 C.F.R.404.1715(a)). Boley was ill at the time, preparing for a double mastectomy, and did not know, until it was too late, that her lawyer was unaware of the decision. An ALJ dismissed an untimely hearing request, finding that Boley lacked “good cause” because she had received notice and could have filed a request herself. A district judge dismissed her petition for judicial review, based on 42 U.S.C. 05(g), which authorizes review of the agency’s final decisions made “after a hearing.” The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to decide whether substantial evidence, and appropriate procedures, underlie the decision that Boley lacks “good cause” for her delay in seeking intra-agency review. In doing so, the court overruled its own precedent and noted a divide among the circuits.
| ||||||||||
Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Langenbach began stocking shelves for Wal-Mart in 1998. The next year, she was promoted. In 2001, she was again promoted. Langenbach was admitted to Wal-Mart’s Management-In-Training program in 2008. In her first evaluation as an Assistant Manager, she was rated as a “Solid Performer” with noted deficiencies. Later that year, Langenbach was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. The PIP was never completed. Her managers did not hold the anticipated follow-up meetings. She later received a comment that she was not following management routines and frequently failed to complete her duties on time. At her 2010 review, Langenbach received a competency score of 2.63 out of 5 and a rating of “Development Needed,” noting specific issues. That month, Langenbach needed surgery and was granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Her next evaluation assessed overall competency at 2.26 out of 5 and rated her as “Development Needed.” Langenbach was again placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. At three follow-up sessions, she was rated as “Below Expectations.” She was terminated five months after returning from leave. The district court rejected claims that Wal-Mart retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights and discriminated against her by delaying her promotion, paying her less than her male counterparts, and refusing to promote her further. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States
In 2012 the Drug Enforcement Administration seized over $110,000 worth of smokable “incense products” from the Smoke Shop, a Delavan, Wisconsin retailer. At the time of seizure, the DEA believed that the incense products, which contained synthetic cannabinoids, were controlled substance analogues and illegal under federal drug laws. Smoke Shop sought return of its inventory in federal district court. Later, the substances in the incense products were scheduled by the Attorney General, rendering them contraband and eliminating Smoke Shop’s hopes of recovering the goods, so it brought a conversion action for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed, finding that the government enjoyed sovereign immunity under the detained-goods exception to the FTCA, and, alternatively that Smoke Shop failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not submit a claim for damages to either the DEA or the Department of Justice before filing suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on both grounds.
| ||||||||||
Saturday, August 02, 2014
Daily Opinion Summaries U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Summaries for August 2, 2014
| ||||||||||
| ||||||||||
Fenton v. Dudley
Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||||
Llovet v. City of Chicago
After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions.
| ||||||||||
Ashburn v. Atchison
Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury.
| ||||||||||
Webster v. Caraway
Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review.
| ||||||||||
Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.
JAB designs, manufactures, and sells men’s clothing and accessories and has 31 Illinois retail locations. In July 2012, Camasta went to the Deer Park JAB store. Before making his purchases, Camasta contends that he saw an advertisement about “sale prices.” At the time of Camasta’s visit, JAB customers were offered a promotion: “buy one shirt, get two shirts free.” Camasta paid $79.50 for one shirt getting two similar shirts for free, and bought another shirt for $87.50 allowing him to receive two more shirts for free. After this purchase, Camasta claims that he learned the JAB “sale” was not actually a reduced price, but was the JAB practice to advertise normal prices as temporary price reductions. Camasta asserts that but for his belief that the advertised sale was a limited time offer, he would not have purchased the six shirts. On behalf of himself and a putative class, Camasta filed a complaint, accusing JAB of violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on the company’s “sales practice of advertising the normal retail price as a temporary price reduction.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Camasta's "sparse" and "conclusory" allegations.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Davis
Davis and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute 280 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Later, Davis was charged in an information for conspiracy to distribute 28 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010. That same day, Davis entered into a written agreement, which stated that Davis would plead guilty to the information and waive prosecution by indictment; the government would dismiss the indictment and recommend: the relevant conduct attributable to Davis is at least 196 grams but less than 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine; an applicable base offense level of 30; a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and an additional one-level decrease for timely notice of his intention to plead guilty; and a sentencing recommendation at the low end of the applicable guideline range. The Presentence Report, incorporating the recommendations, assigned a total offense level of 27 (base level of 30 minus a three-level decrease) resulting in a range of 130–162 months. Davis made efforts to withdraw his plea, complicated by his switching lawyers, and repeated disputes about the facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 120- month sentence, rejecting claims that the statements made by the government ran counter to the agreed-to recommendations.
| ||||||||||
United States v. Cejas
FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy.
| ||||||||||
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)