Summaries for August 2, 2014
- Fenton v. Dudley
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Injury Law, Legal Ethics
- Llovet v. City of Chicago
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
- Ashburn v. Atchison
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
- Webster v. Caraway
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
- Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.
Business Law, Consumer Law, Injury Law
- United States v. Davis
Criminal Law
- United States v. Cejas
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
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| Docket: 14-1067 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Flaum |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Injury Law, Legal Ethics |
Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
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| Docket: 13-3351 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Posner |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions.
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| Docket: 12-3365 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Manion |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury.
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| Docket: 14-1049 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Easterbrook |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review.
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| Docket: 13-2831 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Bauer |
| Areas of Law: Business Law, Consumer Law, Injury Law |
JAB designs, manufactures, and sells men’s clothing and accessories and has 31 Illinois retail locations. In July 2012, Camasta went to the Deer Park JAB store. Before making his purchases, Camasta contends that he saw an advertisement about “sale prices.” At the time of Camasta’s visit, JAB customers were offered a promotion: “buy one shirt, get two shirts free.” Camasta paid $79.50 for one shirt getting two similar shirts for free, and bought another shirt for $87.50 allowing him to receive two more shirts for free. After this purchase, Camasta claims that he learned the JAB “sale” was not actually a reduced price, but was the JAB practice to advertise normal prices as temporary price reductions. Camasta asserts that but for his belief that the advertised sale was a limited time offer, he would not have purchased the six shirts. On behalf of himself and a putative class, Camasta filed a complaint, accusing JAB of violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on the company’s “sales practice of advertising the normal retail price as a temporary price reduction.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Camasta's "sparse" and "conclusory" allegations.
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| Docket: 13-1978 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Kanne |
| Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
Davis and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute 280 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Later, Davis was charged in an information for conspiracy to distribute 28 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010. That same day, Davis entered into a written agreement, which stated that Davis would plead guilty to the information and waive prosecution by indictment; the government would dismiss the indictment and recommend: the relevant conduct attributable to Davis is at least 196 grams but less than 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine; an applicable base offense level of 30; a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and an additional one-level decrease for timely notice of his intention to plead guilty; and a sentencing recommendation at the low end of the applicable guideline range. The Presentence Report, incorporating the recommendations, assigned a total offense level of 27 (base level of 30 minus a three-level decrease) resulting in a range of 130–162 months. Davis made efforts to withdraw his plea, complicated by his switching lawyers, and repeated disputes about the facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 120- month sentence, rejecting claims that the statements made by the government ran counter to the agreed-to recommendations.
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| Docket: 13-1034 | Opinion Date: August 1, 2014 |
| Judge: Williams |
| Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy.
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