| Docket: 12-3639 | Opinion Date: March 3, 2014 |
| Judge: Ripple |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Kingsley was a pretrial detaineel. A deputy noticed a sheet of yellow paper covering the light above Kingsley’s bed and ordered him to take it down. Kingsley refused, stating that he had not put the paper there. When the deputy later returned, he again ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. During morning rounds, another officer ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. Kingsley did not comply. Minutes later, an officer delivering Kingsley’s medication ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. After several requests, Kingsley still refused. Kingsley refused an order from the administrator, who said jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived, ordered Kingsley to stand up and to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie facedown on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five second. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Months later, Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants; a claim of excessive force against two officers proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court conflated the standards for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and wrongly instructed the jury to consider the defendants’ subjective intent.
|
| Docket: 11-2706 | Opinion Date: March 3, 2014 |
| Judge: Rovner |
| Areas of Law: Immigration Law |
After guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) kidnapped her father and killed her uncle, petitioner fled Colombia. After entering the U.S. legally on a tourist visa, she and her family overstayed their visa and applied for asylum within one year, claiming that they were victims of persecution by the FARC and were in danger of future persecution should they return to Colombia. Petitioner’s husband and daughter filed derivative claims. The immigration judge concluded that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof that she has suffered past persecution or would suffer from future persecution on the basis of her membership in a social group of land owners or because of her political opinion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded, stating that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. The question of who is persecuted by FARC threats and whether the government is unable or unwilling to contain them is unresolved.
|
| Docket: 13-3281 | Opinion Date: March 3, 2014 |
| Judge: Ripple |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
Debenedetto was arrested for transmitting threatening communications (18 U.S.C. 875(c)). The district court ordered a mental competency evaluation. After a hearing, the court determined that Debenedetto suffered from mental disease or defect that rendered him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be placed in a federal medical center, Butner. Months later, the court reviewed the result of a second examination and held a hearing regarding the need to medicate Debenedetto without his consent. Defense counsel argued that he believed that Debenedetto, already in custody for 16 months, had already served the guidelines range for his offense and raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the drugs. After an adjournment, counsel represented that Debenedetto had agreed to go back to Butner and, “if they feel involuntary medication is appropriate, that should be done, but they should also review or consider less intrusive measures.” Debenedetto spoke, expressing concerns that he had previously had seizures and indicated his belief that medication was not necessary. Debenedetto filed a pro se appeal from the subsequent commitment order. After the government indicated intent to execute the order promptly, his attorney moved to stay the order and to withdraw as counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the hearing and written findings did not establish the elements necessary to justify involuntary medication.
|
No comments:
Post a Comment