Renee J. Walker ("Mrs. Walker") requested judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
On November 4, 2009, Mrs. Walker filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability beginning November 25, 2008. Mrs. Walker's application was denied initially on March 9, 2010, and upon reconsideration on June 3, 2010. Thereafter, Mrs. Walker filed a request for a hearing, and a video hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Ronald T. Jordan ("the ALJ") on May 26, 2011. Mrs. Smith was represented by counsel at the hearing. On July 6, 2011, the ALJ denied Mrs. Walker's application. On July 25, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Mrs. Walker's request for review of the ALJ's decision, making it the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. Mrs. Walker filed this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for review of the ALJ's decision.
Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must demonstrate that her physical or mental limitations prevent her from doing not only her previous work, but any other kind of gainful employment which exists in the national economy, considering her age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a five-step sequential analysis. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled, despite her medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, if the claimant does not have "severe" impairment (i.e. one that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work activities) that meets the durational requirement, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelve month duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). In order to determine steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC, which is the "maximum that a claimant can still do despite her mental and physical limitations." Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 4040.1545(a)(1); SSR 96-8p). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform her past work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five, if the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). When applying this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the Commissioner for the fifth step.Zuraawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001).
As part of her testimony, Mrs. Walker told the Court that she spent hours playing games on Facebook to help relieve her stress. Additionally, Mrs. Walker stated that she has trouble with her memory which she has been told is caused by her fibromyalgia but she thought it was more closely related to Alzheimer's disease because her father and aunt both had the disease.
Mrs. Walker raised three issues in her appeal. First, she argued that the ALJ's decision that she was not disabled due fibromyalgia and chronic pain was not supported by substantial evidence. Next, she argued the ALJ's credibility decision was patently erroneous because it is contrary to Social Security Regulation 96-7p ("SSR 96-7p"). Finally, she argued that the ALJ's step five determination was not supported by substantial evidence.
Upon careful review, the Court found that the ALJ's decision that Mrs. Walker was not disabled due to fibromyalgia and chronic pain was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ's credibility determination was not patently wrong, the ALJ's step five determination that Mrs. Walker could perform some jobs was supported by substantial evidence.
The Court concluded by stating "[T]he ALJ is required only to incorporate into his hypotheticals those impairments and limitations that he accepts as credible." Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 521 (7th Cir. 2009). The ALJ did not find Mrs. Walker's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms credible because they were inconsistent with the record. In its earlier discussion, the Court determined that the ALJ's credibility decision was not patently wrong. The ALJ's hypotheticals included the RFC that this Court has found was supported by substantial evidence. Under O'Conner-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619-21 (7th Cir. 2010), as long as the ALJ's RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence, and there is no inconsistency between the RFC and the hypothetical question, remand is not mandated. See Packham v. Astrue, 762 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's hypothetical is consistent with the RFC and is therefore not erroneous.
V. CONCLUSION
.
.
RENEE J. WALKER, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Defendant.
United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
