Weekly Summaries Distributed November 13, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
In Re: Google Inc Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.
Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. Essentially they claimed that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers. They cited the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510; the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C 2701; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030; and, against Google, violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution, intrusion upon seclusion, the state Unfair Competition Law, the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, and the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims, stating that fraud or deceit does not amount to wiretapping; the alleged conduct implicated no protected “facility” under the Stored Communications Act; and the plaintiffs alleged no damages under the Fraud Act. The court vacated dismissal of the state law claims against Google.
| ||||||||
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n
The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). The Commission instituted an investigation based on a complaint filed by Align, concerning violation of 19 U.S.C. 1337 by reason of infringement of various claims of seven different patents concerning orthodontic devices. The accused “articles” were the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment” from Pakistan to the United States. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
| ||||||||
Illinois Social Media Law, Conservative News, Chicago & National Politics
Vote Trump 2016 !
Trump 2016
Showing posts with label Internet Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Internet Law. Show all posts
Friday, November 13, 2015
Internet Law
Friday, September 25, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed September 25, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc.
Google's AdWords program is an auction-based program through which advertisers would bid for Google to place their advertisements on websites. Pulaski and others filed a putative class action alleging that Google misled them as to the types of websites on which their advertisements could appear. On appeal, Pulaski challenged the district court's denial of class certification, holding that on the claim for restitution, common questions did not predominate over questions affecting individual class members. The court held that a court need not make individual determinations regarding entitlement to restitution. Instead, restitution is available on a class wide basis once the class representative makes the threshold showing of liability. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding that such individual questions would predominate. In Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., the court held that damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification. The court concluded that Yokoyama remains the law of the court and the district court erred in not following the rule in Yokoyama. Finally, the court concluded that the proposed method for calculating restitution was not “arbitrary” under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
| ||||||||
Friday, July 24, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed July 23, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.
The 505 Patent claims “the use of a conventional web browser Back and Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online application consisting of dynamically generated web pages,” “retaining information lost in the navigation of online forms.” The district court rejected an infringement suit, deeming this to be an abstract concept, ineligible for patenting, 35 U.S.C. 101. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that by setting out the abstract idea of a known technological challenge without setting out any specific disclosures, the Patent “added no elements or combination of elements, sometimes referred to as the inventive concept, sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law or the abstract idea.
| ||||||||
Tartell v. South Florida Sinus and Allergy Ctr.
After Dr. Paul B. Tartell and Dr. Lee M. Mandel split their practices, Dr. Mandel registered six domain names with variations of Dr. Tartell’s name. Dr. Tartell then filed a complaint against Dr. Mandel, his incorporated practice, and another corporation owned by Dr. Mandel for cybersquatting, false designation of origin, and unfair competition. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred by ruling that Dr. Tartell's name had acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers. Although Dr. Tartell produced some evidence relevant to the Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton factors, he failed to produce any substantial evidence of what his name denotes to the consumer; Dr. Tartell’s evidence about the use of his name in academic settings and evidence about his reputation among other medical professionals are not probative of whether his name had acquired secondary meaning; Dr. Tartell produced no substantial evidence to demonstrate the degree of actual recognition by the public; and Dr. Tartell’s remaining evidence says nothing about the perceptions of consumers. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Mandel and his corporations.
| ||||||||
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Captal One Bank
Intellectual Ventures owns the 137 patent, entitled “Administration of Financial Accounts,” claims methods of budgeting, particularly methods of tracking and storing information relating to a user’s purchases and expenses and presenting that information to the user based on pre-established, self-imposed spending limits. Its 382 patent, entitled “Advanced Internet Interface Providing User Display Access of Customized Webpages,” claims methods and systems for providing customized web page content to the user as a function of user-specific information and the user’s navigation history. The 587 patent, entitled “Method for Organizing Digital Images,” claims methods for scanning hard-copy images onto a computer in an organized manner. Intellectual Ventures sued, asserting infringement by Capital One. Following the district court’s claim construction of the term “machine readable instruction form” in the 587 patent, the parties stipulated to non-infringement. The district court also determined that the asserted claims of the 137 patent claimed ineligible subject matter and the asserted claims of the 382 patent claimed ineligible subject matter and were indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b). The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that the asserted claims of the 137 and 382 patents claim unpatentable abstract ideas and that claim construction with respect to the 587 patent was correct.
| ||||||||
Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com
MTM filed suit against online retailer Amazon under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., alleging that Amazon had infringed MTM's trademark. MTM argues that initial interest confusion might occur because Amazon lists the search term used – here the trademarked phrase “mtm special ops” – three times at the top of its search page. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon. The court considered five non-exhaustive Sleekcraft factors to determine whether a trademark gives rise to a likelihood of confusion: the strength of the mark, relatedness/proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, defendant’s intent, and the degree of care exercised by purchasers. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion under the initial interest confusion theory. Finally, the court held that the customer-generated use of a trademark in the retail search context is a use in commerce. In this case, Amazon's purpose is not less commercial just because it is selling wares, not advertising space. Therefore, the court declined to affirm the district court on the alternative ground that Amazon’s use is not a use in commerce. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
| ||||||||
Friday, June 05, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed June 5, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Elonis v. United States
Elonis used the Web site Facebook to post lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, children, and law enforcement, interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious” and that Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. His boss fired him. His wife obtained an order of protection. Elonis’s former employer contacted the FBI. The agency monitored Elonis’s Facebook activity and charged him under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” Elonis requested a jury instruction that the government was required to prove that he intended to communicate a “true threat.” The district court told the jury that Elonis could be found guilty if a reasonable person would foresee that his statements would be interpreted as a threat. Elonis was convicted. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The instruction, requiring only negligence with respect to communication of a threat, is not sufficient to support conviction under Section 875(c). Mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent does not eliminate that requirement. Wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal. This does not mean that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal, but a defendant must have knowledge of “the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.” In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is sufficient, but where such a requirement would not protect an innocent actor, the statute must be read to require specific intent. The crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under Section 875(c) is the threatening nature of the communication, so the mental state requirement must apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat. The requirement is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. The Court did not address whether a mental state of recklessness would also suffice or First Amendment issues.
| ||||||||
Friday, May 29, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed May 29, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
United States v. Apple Inc.
The district court found Apple in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because Apple facilitated and executed a conspiracy where five of the six largest e-book publishers in the country entered into a horizontal conspiracy to eliminate retail price competition in order to raise e-book prices. The district court issued an external compliance monitor through a permanent injunction. At issue on appeal is the district court’s denial of the motion to disqualify the appointed monitor, and modifications of the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disqualify the monitor based on the record before the district court. The court also concluded that, in light of the court's intervening interpretation of the injunction, the terms of the injunction are not currently affected by modifications (if any) made by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the district court without prejudice. The court ordered the letter at issue disclosing the fee schedule unsealed and directed the Clerk of the Court to make that letter publicly available on the docket.
| ||||||||
Friday, May 15, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed May 15, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc..
The 703 patent concerns a method of delivering internet content. A jury found that Limelight practices every step of the methods disclosed in the patent’s four claims except the “tagging” step, which is performed by Limelight’s customers. Customers must tag the content to be hosted and delivered by Limelight’s content delivery network. Limelight instructs its customers how to tag, and employees are on call if customers require additional assistance. In a 2014 decision, the Federal Circuit held that because Limelight did not perform all of the steps of the asserted method claims and because there was no basis on which to impose liability on Limelight for the actions of its customers who carried out the other steps Limelight did not directly infringed the patent under 35 U.S.C. 271(a). After remand by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found no infringement, stating that the statutory framework “does not admit to the sweeping notions of common-law tort liability argued in this case.” The court noted that the case involved neither agency nor contract nor joint enterprise. Encouraging or instructing others to perform an act is not the same as performing the act oneself and does not result in direct infringement.
| ||||||||
Friday, April 17, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed April 17, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Byrd v. Aaron's Inc
Aaron’s stores sell and lease residential and office furniture, consumer electronics, and appliances. Byrd leased a laptop computer from Aspen, an Aaron’s franchisee. Although Byrd asserts that she made full payments, an Aspen agent came to repossess the laptop, claiming that the payments had not been made. The agent allegedly presented a screenshot of a poker website Byrd had visited as well as a picture of Byrd taken by the laptop’s camera. Aspen obtained the picture and screenshot through spyware named “PC Rental Agent” that can collect screenshots, keystrokes, and webcam images from the computer and its users. Between November 16, 2010 and December 20, 2010, the Byrds alleged that this spyware secretly accessed their laptop 347 times on 11 different days. According their putative class action, alleging violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, 895 customers had surveillance conducted through PC Rental Agent. Concluding that the proposed classes were not ascertainable, the district court denied class certification. The Third Circuit reversed. The court erred by: misstating the rule governing ascertainability; engrafting an “underinclusive” requirement; finding that an “overly broad” class was not ascertainable; and improperly applying precedent to the issue of whether “household members” could be ascertainable.
| ||||||||
Friday, March 20, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed March 20, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456
Peter Ricci, a Teamsters member since 1983, refused to endorse Union President Doyle in 2002. For the next 10 years, Ricci claims, he suffered retaliation. He was fired from jobs he should have kept; he was not placed in jobs he should have gotten; and generally disfavored, even as compared with members with less seniority. In 2012, members of the Union distributed newsletters containing statements about the Riccis. Those newsletters were also published on a website hosted on GoDaddy’s web servers. The Riccis claim that GoDaddy refused to investigate Ricci’s complaints. In the Ricci’s pro se defamation and retaliation suit, the district court dismissed all claims against GoDaddy and federal claims against the Union. The Second Circuit affirmed. GoDaddy is immune from the defamation claims under the Communications Decency Act of 1996: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), and “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The labor claims were barred by the NLRA’s six‐ month statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. 160(b).
| ||||||||
Friday, March 13, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed March 13, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Fridman v. NYCB Mortgage Co. LLC
Fridman paid her mortgage electronically, using the online payment system on the website of her mortgage servicer, NYCB. By furnishing the required information and clicking on the required spot, she authorized NYCB to collect funds from her Bank of America account. Although Fridman filled out the form within the grace period allowed by her note, NYCB did not credit her payment for two business days, causing Fridman to incur a late fee. Fridman filed suit on behalf of herself and a putative class, alleging that NYCB’s practice of not crediting online payments on the day that the consumer authorizes them violates the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601. The district court granted NYCB summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An electronic authorization for a mortgage payment entered on the mortgage servicer’s website is a “payment instrument or other means of payment.” TILA requires mortgage services to credit these authorizations when they “reach the mortgage servicer.”
| ||||||||
Friday, March 06, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed March 6, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Couture v. Playdom, Inc.
In May 2008, Couture applied to register the service mark PLAYDOM under Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051(a), submitting a “[s]creen capture of [a] website offering Entertainment Services in commerce.” His website, www.playdominc.com, then included only a single page, stating: “[w]elcome to PlaydomInc.com. We are proud to offer writing and production services for motion picture film, television, and new media. Please feel free to contact us if you are interested:playdominc@gmail.com,” with the notice: “Website Under Construction.” No services under the mark were provided until 2010. The PLAYDOM mark was registered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in January 2009. On February 9, 2009, Playdom, Inc. applied to register the identical mark. The registered mark was cited as a ground for rejecting the application. Playdom, Inc. sought to cancel the registration of Couture’s mark as void ab initio because Couturehad not used the mark in commerce as of the date of the application. The Board granted cancellation, stating that Couture “had not rendered his services as of the filing date of his application” because he had “merely posted a website advertising his readiness, willingness and ability to render said services.” The Federal Circuit affirmed.
| ||||||||
Friday, February 13, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed February 13, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Soverain Software, LLC v. Victoria's Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC
Soverain Software sued Victoria’s Secret and Avon for infringement of its patents relating to virtual shopping carts and to using a hypertext statement so that users can access information about past orders. The district court found that defendants infringed certain claims and that those claims were not invalid. After the district court’s judgment, the Federal Circuit, in 2013, decided Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., finding certain of the claims invalid as obvious The Federal Circuit then reversed as to Victoria’s Secret and Avon, holding that issue preclusion applies as a result of the Newegg case, and that the asserted claims here are therefore invalid.
| ||||||||
Friday, February 06, 2015
Internet Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed February 6, 2015
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
Beyond Systems v. Kraft Foods
Beyond Systems, an internet service provider, filed suit against Kraft and Connexus seeking damages under California's and Maryland's anti-spam statutes based upon several hundred e-mails which it alleges were unlawful spam. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Beyond Systems had Article III standing by claiming a harm: receiving spam e-mail. On the merits, the court agreed with the district court that Beyond Systems is barred from recovery because it consented to the harm underpinning its anti-spam claims. In this case, Beyond Systems created fake e-mail addresses, solely for the purpose of gathering spam; it embedded these addresses in websites so that they were undiscoverable except to computer programs that serve no other function than to find e-mail accounts to spam; it increased its e-mail storage capacity to retain a huge volume of spam; and it intentionally participated in routing spam e-mail between California and Maryland to increase its exposure to spam and thereby allow it to sue under both states' laws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
| ||||||||
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)