Netherlands Ins.. Co. v. Phusion Projects, Inc.
Phusion manufactures and distributes an alcoholic beverage called “Four Loko.” Its original formula contained energy stimulants, such as caffeine, guarana, taurine, and wormwood. Phusion purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy and a umbrella policy from members of the Liberty Mutual Group. The policies include identical provisions, excluding coverage for bodily injury or property damage when the insured may be held liable by reason of causing or contributing to intoxication. Plaintiffs sued Phusion in separate state court actions, alleging injuries caused by consumption of Four Loko. Two cases involved traffic accidents, one involved a shooting, another involved paranoid behavior resulting in accidental death, and a fifth claim involved a death from heart trouble. Phusion notified Liberty, which sought a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage. The district court examined the underlying cases in the context of comparable automobile exclusions and ruled that four of the five cases fell within the Liquor Liability Exclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Liquor Liability Exclusions in the policies are unambiguous and apply to Phusion. The allegations of simple negligence raised by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints are not sufficiently independent from the allegations that Phusion caused or contributed to the intoxication of any person.
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Kim v. Holder
Kim, his wife Ko, and their children are citizens of South Korea who were admitted to the U.S. in 2003, as nonimmigrant visitors for pleasure. Before an extension expired, Ko, obtained an F-1 visa, changing her status to that of a nonimmigrant student. As beneficiary of his wife’s application, Kim’s status was changed to that of spouse of a nonimmigrant student. In 2006, Ko’s F-1 status and, consequently, Kim’s F-2 status, were terminated. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services stated that Ko was ineligible for reinstatement because she had stopped attending classes without informing the school of an illness that she later claimed. While Ko’s motion to reopen or reconsider was pending, Kim became the beneficiary of an approved immigrant visa as an alien worker and moved to adjust his status to that of lawful permanent resident. USCIS denied the application, finding that he was ineligible because he had failed to maintain continuous lawful status since entering the U.S. In 2009, DHS charged Kim removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). Kim argued that his failure to maintain legal status was due to circumstances beyond his control. The IJ found Kim removable. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for appeal.
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Gogos v. AMS-Mech. Sys., Inc.
Gogos, a pipe welder for 45 years, has taken blood pressure medication for more than eight years. He began working for AMS in December 2012 as a welder and pipe-fitter. The next month, his blood pressure spiked and he experienced intermittent vision loss and a red eye. His supervisor agreed that he could leave to seek immediate medical treatment. As Gogos left work, he saw his general foreman and stated that he was going to the hospital because “my health is not very good lately.” The foreman immediately fired him. After pursuing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Gogos sued. He applied to proceed in forma pauperis and requested that the court recruit counsel, stating that he cannot afford an attorney; that he has only a grammar-school education; and that English is not his primary language. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Gogos’s medical conditions were “transitory” and “suspect.” The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gogos stated a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112.
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United States v. Gonzalez
In November 2010, law enforcement intercepted six railcars that crossed from Mexico into the U.S. and discovered that the railcars contained large amounts of marijuana, which had been packed into bricks. The marijuana bricks were encased in colored clay shells and hidden inside bags called “super sacks.” The officials followed the railcars to their final destination, a warehouse in Chicago Heights, and conducted surveillance of the warehouse to identify the intended recipients. A jury found Gonzalez, who assisted in unloading the cargo, guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kg or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, but acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kg of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court subsequently entered a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that Gonzalez knew, or at least strongly suspected that the super sacks contained illegal drugs and yet continued to participate in the operation.
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United States v. Seidling
Seidling admitted to knowingly mailing documents containing false information about service of process or publication of notice to small claims courts in Wisconsin and hiding the filings of the actions from named defendants. Seidling argued that the elements of the mail fraud statute could not be met because he never intended the false statements and misrepresentations to be communicated to the victims. The combined total intended loss amount was calculated as $370,220. None of the defendants suffered immediate pecuniary harm, but many experienced challenges in reopening the lawsuits, getting them dismissed, clearing their credit, and removing the fraudulent lawsuits from the system. The district court found him guilty of 50 counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no convergence between the victims’ losses and the fraudulent statements. Although his false statements and misrepresentations were not made directly to the victims, they still satisfied the requisite materiality element of mail fraud. The court noted Seidling’s history of fraudulent behavior, his lack of remorse, and the extensive details of his scheme, and held that the district court did not err in denying a reduction in sentencing for acceptance of responsibility.
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Showing posts with label #immigration Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #immigration Law. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
7th Circuit Court of Appeals - #criminal, #health, #immigration Law
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Thursday, December 12, 2013
US 7th Circuit Court of Appeals - Justia
Williams v. State of IL
Docket: 13-2652 | Opinion Date: December 11, 2013 |
Judge: per curiam | |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights |
Williams filed his complaint listing more than 100 defendants, including the state, its Attorney General, and Illinois State University, claiming that university police arrested him without probable cause and that other defendants pursued baseless criminal charges. After 13 months, the magistrate ordered Williams to explain why the defendants had not been served, warning that he was considering recommending dismissal for lack of prosecution. Williams responded that he had been stymied by the university’s refusal to supply names and home addresses of employees and that he had sent university counsel a request for waiver of service. Two more months passed. The magistrate recommended dismissal. When Williams requested summonses, 16 months had elapsed without service on any defendant. The district court dismissed, explaining that Williams had the burden of identifying the names and addresses and that Williams could have served the governmental defendants, but did not. Williams sought to reinstate the case, but the 28-day deadline had passed. On appeal, Williams argued that he had three extra days to ask for reconsideration because he received the dismissal by mail, FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, reasoning that the rule enlarges the filing time only when the period for acting runs from service of a notice, not when the time begins after entry of judgment.
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View Case On: Justia Google ScholarWashington v. Parkinson
Washington was arrested as a suspect in a double homicide. While charges were pending, he filed a civil suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Officer Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight while he was transported. The district court judge conducted voir dire. Juror Evans answered questions concerning his family background without incident. Asked whether he had ever been involved with the civil or criminal justice system, Evans responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon examination, Evans said he did not understand the question. The judge broke the question down and Evans admitted he had been arrested and requested a sidebar. He explained that he had a DUI pending and had suffered head injuries in the accident, but did not have difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Evans spoke slowly and frequently closed his eyes. Washington unsuccessfully challenged Evans for cause. At trial, Washington interrupted several times. He fired his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. The judge asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with jurors who had seen him argue with his attorney. Washington consented to continue with the original jury. He later returned to allowing representation by counsel, who had not left. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkinson. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington waived his challenge to Juror Evans.
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