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Friday, May 29, 2015

Civil Rights

Weekly Summaries Distributed May 29, 2015
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Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 14-1852Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
On December 28, Hudson did not attend work as a Tyson supervisor due to illness. Hudson’s girlfriend (a Tyson employee) told Hudson’s supervisor, Beganovic, that Hudson would be late or absent that day. Hudson claims he texted Beganovic before his shift that he was having health issues and would be out a few days. Tyson’s attendance policy requires managers “to personally call their direct supervisor to report an unplanned absence.” Hudson claims that he often texted with Beganovic, and at least once before (acceptably) notified Beganovic of an absence by text. Hudson missed three work days, saw a doctor, and was diagnosed with back pain and depression. On January 3, Hudson went to Tyson with a doctor’s note and requested leave from December 28 until January 7. He intended to apply for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA ) leave. He signed an application, on which the non-FMLA box was checked. He claims someone else checked it after he signed. On January 4, Tyson granted Hudson non-FMLA leave. Hudson returned to Tyson on January 9 and was terminated for failure to comply with notification policy. Hudson sued under the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Tyson, noting disputes as to whether Tyson enforced its call-in policy.
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Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 14-1239Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
Bonkowski worked for Oberg. He has health conditions, including an aortic bicuspid, diabetes, possible aortic aneurysm, and colon removal. On November 14, Bonkowski met with supervisors to discuss his suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job. According to Bonkowski, he experienced shortness of breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and the supervisors gave him permission to go home. He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. That night, his wife drove him to the hospital. He was admitted shortly after midnight. After testing, he was released in the early evening of November 15, with a doctor’s note. On November 16, Oberg notified Bonkowski that his employment was terminated because he had walked off the job on November 14. The district court rejected his suit under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2611(11)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed, based on a Department of Labor regulation, defining a “serious health condition.” The court held that “an overnight stay” means a stay for a substantial period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by the time of admission and time of discharge. Bonkowski was admitted and discharged on the same calendar day.
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Rex v. Martinez

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 11-5199Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
CFF, a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting adoption, filed suit against the DMV after the DMV rejected CFF's application for a "Choose Life" custom license plate. The district court concluded that DMV violated CFF's First Amendment rights and, in the alternative, that the entire license plate program was unconstitutional on its face because it afforded the DMV Commissioner unbridled discretion over which custom plates to approve. The court concluded, however, that the content of New York’s custom license plates constitutes private speech and that the plates themselves are a nonpublic forum; CFF’s facial challenge fails because New York’s custom plate program did not impermissibly vest the DMV Commissioner with unbridled discretion in approving custom plate designs; and that program, as applied in this case, was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, which is all that the First Amendment requires of restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
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Baker v. City of Iowa City

Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 131877Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law
Employers filed a petition against the City claiming that a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination by all employers violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the antidiscrimination ordinance exceeded the City’s home rule authority and remanded. On remand, Employers argued that the City was liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a matter of law for attempting to enforce the antidiscrimination ordinance in violation of Employers’ rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association and their federal constitutionalrights of due process and equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance did not violate Employers’ federal constitutional rights; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Employers to amend their petition.
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City of Atwood v. Pianalto

Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:109796Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol and speeding. Defendant appealed both convictions and sought a trial de novo in district court, arguing that the evidence was the product of an illegal traffic stop. Specifically, Defendant argued that the officer who initiated the traffic stop did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop because the officer was mistaken about the applicable speed limit where a traffic sign normally posting the limit had been knocked to the ground. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer made a mistake of fact about the speed limit, but the mistake was objectively reasonable.
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Wilson v. Tregre

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 14-31179Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law
Plaintiff, former Chief Deputy in the Sheriff's office, filed suit against the Sheriff, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana whistleblower statutes. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. The court concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because plaintiff's complaints about the recordings at issue were made within the scope of his employment and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that it would have been a waste of judicial resources to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff's state law claims were neither novel nor complex; the court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Sheriff’s Office committed an actual violation of Louisiana law and, therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:967; and La. Rev. Stat. 42: 1169 does not provide a private right of action for plaintiff to sue in either state or federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
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Reed v. Hall

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 14-0342Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently.
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United States v. Flores-Rivera

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 10-1434, Docket: 11-1416,Docket: 12-1538,Docket: 12-1711Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
A multi-count indictment alleged that the four appellants in this case and their forty-three co-defendants participated in a drug trafficking conspiracy. Following a joint trial, the appellants were convicted and sentenced to various prison terms ranging from 151 months to life imprisonment. The First Circuit (1) remanded two of the appellants’ cases for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in denying those appellants’ motions for a new trial based on the government’s failure to disclose evidence required to be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland and that the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of changing the result for those two appellants; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error arising from the claims that the remaining two appellants brought.
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United States v. Dixon

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 14-1124Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from a search of Defendant’s apartment by police pursuant to a search warrant that resulted in the police finding a pistol and eight rounds of ammunition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the affidavit used to support the search of Defendant’s person and apartment was sufficient to establish probable cause; (2) the government met its burden of establishing the interstate commerce element of the felon-in-possession charge; and (3) the district court’s jury instructions concerning the interstate commerce element were not in error.
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United States v. Tanguay

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 14-1174Opinion Date: May 22, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law
Pursuant to a warrant to search Appellant’s home, vehicle, and workplace, the police seized a computer, hard drive, and compact disc that were found to contain sexually explicit images and videos depicting minors. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of child pornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting that the officer who applied for the search warrant had deliberately or recklessly omitted material information from her affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that an officer seeking to obtain a search warrant has no duty as a matter of law to inquire further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom the officer relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable cause. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an affiant never has a duty to make further inquiry before presenting a warrant application to a magistrate.
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Rey v. United States

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 14-1984Opinion Date: May 26, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law
Rey was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846. The jury found that the conspiracy involved between five and 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court determined that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 grams of cocaine base and sentenced Rey to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2009, Rey filed a preprinted form entitled “Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” The court rejected his claims that he did not receive a fair trial, his trial counsel was ineffective, and the court sentenced him based on a greater drug weight than found by the jury. Later, Rey filed a letter stating that he did not intend to file a motion, but was merely seeking assistance of counsel to help him file a motion. The court responded that it would “await any further filing ... to determine whether it constitutes a second or successive 2255 petition.” In 2014, with assistance of counsel, Rey filed a 2255 motion, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. The district court dismissed it as an uncertified second or successive petition and found that the motion was untimely because the Supreme Court has not declared Alleyne to be retroactively applicable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
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Boose v. District of Columbia

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitDocket: 14-7086Opinion Date: May 26, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking an order requiring DCPS to provide her son with compensatory education. The district court dismissed the suit as moot because the school system responded to the complaint by offering an individualized education plan that is adequate to keep the child on track going forward. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to address whether the child was entitled to compensatory education, which is a remedy that remains available. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.
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