Civil Rights
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Weekly Summaries Distributed May 22, 2015
- Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility
Civil Rights, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- State v. Funk
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- State v. Aguirre
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- State v. Soto
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- Lash v. Lemke
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
- Drimal v. Makol
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for HumanRights
Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law, Government & Administrative Law Alaska Supreme Court
- Merricks v. Adkisson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Supreme Court
- Coleman v. Tollefson
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law U.S. Supreme Court
- Diaz-Colon v. Solivan-Solivan
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Injury Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Lee v. Government of D.C.
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
- Hankins v. Lowe
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- State v. Kimball
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Maine Supreme Judicial Court
- Hines v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Indiana
- State v. Schowengerdt
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Montana Supreme Court
- Ussery v. Mansfield
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- In re: Sena
Civil Rights, Criminal Law California Court of Appeal
- State ex rel. Lorenzetti v. Hon. Sanders
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- Isom v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Indiana
- A-1 A-Lectrician v. Snipes
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Noll v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- People v. Allen
Civil Rights, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Illinois
- People v. Gaytan
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Illinois
- Gooch v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court
- Isom v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court
- Childress v. Walker
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Highland Mining Co. v. W. Va. Univ. Sch. of Medicine
Civil Rights Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- In re GC
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law Wyoming Supreme Court
- People v. Kuehner
Civil Rights, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Illinois
- Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc.
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Foster v. Univ. of Maryland Eastern
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- Blake v. Ross
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 12-4003 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
Barton’s wife, Vicki, was killed in a 1995 burglary. Detectives determined that Barton was elsewhere at the time of her death. In 1998 Henson was arrested in an unrelated burglary, and stated that his half-brother, Phelps had been involved romantically with Vicki, went to her house to steal, panicked, and shot her. Henson believed that Phelps’ subsequent suicide was related. Phelps’ body was exhumed . There was no DNA match. In a 2003 re-examination of the file, it was discovered that in Barton’s 911 call, he referenced needing to call “Phelp man.” Detectives re-interviewed Henson, who later testified that Barton paid Phelps to go to Vicki’s residence to scare her; that Phelps took unidentified accomplice; and that the accomplice shot and sexually assaulted Vicki. Under cross examination, Henson denied originally telling detectives that Phelps shot Vicki. Barton’s federal habeas petition was rejected. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the withholding of evidence that would have impeached the sole prosecution witness. Henson testified that he had committed staged burglaries for hire. Before trial, the state provided Barton with a police report documenting the 1993 Kelly burglary, which was suspected to have been staged. The state did not inform him that it had re-opened the Kelly investigation after Henson implicated Barton. Questioned before Barton’s trial, Kelly vehemently denied hiring Henson to stage a burglary. Barton did not learn of Kelly’s statements until after his trial, by means of his own investigation
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| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:107422 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted indecent solicitation of a child. The district court sentenced Appellant to eighteen months’ probation, with an underlying ten-month prison term and lifetime postrelease supervision. Appellant appealed, contending that lifetime postrelease supervision was disproportionate as applied to him, constituting cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant abandoned his Eighth Amendment challenge on appeal for failure to adequately brief the issue; and (2) Appellant’s lifetime postrelease supervision term does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights.
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| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:108570 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder based on his premeditated intentional killing of his ex-girlfriend and their one-year-old son. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made during two separate interrogations by law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the interrogating officers refused to terminate the questioning when Defendant invoked his rights under Miranda v. Arizona; and (2) because the error was not harmless, the district court erred in denying the suppression of Defendant’s statements made after the Miranda violation.
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| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:109374 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial based on the State’s failure to disclose a plea agreement with the codefendant, as the plea agreement would not have changed the course of the trial by making the codefendant available to testify at trial; and (2) the district court’s failure to give a second-degree murder jury instruction was not clearly erroneous.
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitDocket: 13-5308 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Plaintiff filed suit against law enforcement officers, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, after he was tased when resisting arrest at an Occupy D.C. encampment. The district court concluded that the officers were protected by qualified immunity against plaintiff's claims because the officer's use of the Taser did not violate the Constitution. The court agreed with the district court that qualified immunity shields the officers from plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, but on different grounds. The court held that a person actively resisting arrest does not have a clearly established rightagainst a single use of a Taser to subdue him. The court also granted summary judgment to the officers on the First Amendment claim where plaintiff failed to meaningfully advance the argument on appeal.
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 13-2963 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Plaintiff filed suit against FBI agents alleging that they violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510‐2522, when they listened to her private calls with her husband. The agents had an authorized wiretap on the telephone of plaintiff's husband as part of an investigation into a conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The calls were intercepted during the authorized wiretap. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint does not plausibly state a claim because it recites only legal conclusions. The court also concluded that the district court, in its qualified immunity analysis, should have assessed the reasonableness of the agents' minimization efforts as they relate to each defendant.
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| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-15594 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law, Government & Administrative Law |
The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees.
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 14-12801 | Opinion Date: May 15, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a law enforcement officer, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for injuries she suffered from his alleged use of excessive force during a traffic stop and search of her car. The court concluded that no clearly established law put defendant on notice that his conduct in stopping plaintiff and searching her car violated her constitutional rights. In this case, defendant had probable cause to stop and to search plaintiff’s vehicle; not only did she refuse to let him search it, she struggled with him to keep him from searching it by stopping him from taking her keys to turn off her car; the only force that defendant applied that she complained about was two yanks to get her out of the driver’s seat; he never applied any other force; and he did not even handcuff her. Therefore, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment.
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| Court: U.S. Supreme Court Docket: 13-1412 | Opinion Date: May 18, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Sheehan lived in a group home for individuals with mental illness. After Sheehan threatened to kill her social worker, San Francisco dispatched officers to escort Sheehan to a facility for evaluation and treatment. When the officers entered Sheehan’s room, she grabbed a knife and threatened them. They retreated and closed the door. Concerned about what Sheehan might do, and without considering whether they could accommodate her disability, the officers reentered. Sheehan, knife in hand, again confronted them. After pepper spray proved ineffective, the officers shot Sheehan multiple times. Sheehan sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132 and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applied and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as to whether the ADA “requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody,” because, instead of arguing that the ADA does not apply when an officer faces an armed and dangerous individual, San Francisco argued only that Sheehan was not “qualified” for an accommodation, because she “pose[d] a direct threat to the health or safety of others,” which could not “be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.” The lower courts did not address that question. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for injuries suffered by Sheehan. Their use of force was also reasonable. Any Fourth Amendment right involving accommodation of a disability, even assuming it exists, was not clearly established.
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| Court: U.S. Supreme Court Docket: 13-1333 | Opinion Date: May 18, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
A federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis and commence a civil action without prepaying fees or paying certain expenses, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), but a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . , brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A state prisoner filed three federal lawsuits that were dismissed on grounds enumerated in section 1915(g). While the third dismissal was pending on appeal, he filed four additional federal lawsuits, moving to proceed in forma pauperis in each. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A prior dismissal on statutorily enumerated grounds is a strike, even if the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing appeal. Section 1915 describes dismissal as an action by a single court, not as a sequence of events involving multiple courts. The Court noted that a judgment normally takes effect, and its preclusive effect is immediate, despite a pending appeall. The “three strikes” provision was “designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” To refuse to count a prior dismissal because of a pending appeal would produce a leaky filter.
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 13-2340 | Opinion Date: May 18, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Injury Law |
In two separate murder trials in Puerto Rico’s courts, jurors convicted a group of individuals based in large part on the testimony of a single witness. When that witness later recanted her testimony, the Commonwealth courts vacated the convictions and dropped the charges against the convicted individuals. Thereafter, the wrongfully convicted individuals (and/or their heirs and family members) filed these consolidated civil damages actions against police officers and prosecutors involved in their prosecutions, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various constitutional and tort claims under Puerto Rico law. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on absolute or qualified immunities. The district court rejected the defenses. The First Circuit (1) reversed in part the denial of summary judgment for the assistant district attorney, holding that absolute immunity shielded the assistant district attorney from having to stand trial for Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims under section 1983; and (2) otherwise affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that, to the extent the appeal was predicated on Defendants’ qualified immunity defense under federal or state law, Defendants’ claims were waived for inadequate briefing.
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| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia CircuitDocket: 13-7123 |
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