Weekly Summaries Distributed April 17, 2015
- In re T.S.S.
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law Vermont Supreme Court
- United States v. Stafford
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Siluk v. Merwin
Civil Rights, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
- United States v. Torres-Landrua
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Lapointe v. Comm’r of Corr.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Connecticut Supreme Court
- LSCP, LLLP v. Kay-Decker
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Tax Law Iowa Supreme Court
- Makiel v. Butler
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- State v. Knox
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- State v. Seen
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- Frohnapfel v. Arcelormittal USA LLC
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- Cox v. United States
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Chavero-Linares v. Smith
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights
Civil Rights, Injury Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Commonwealth v. Colondres
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- United States v. Aviles-Vega
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Rhodes v. Dittmann
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Commonwealth v. Newson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC
Agriculture Law, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Injury Law Supreme Court of Missouri
- People v. Diaz
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law California Court of Appeal
- Moore v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Missouri
- State v. Dupree
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Montana Supreme Court
- State v. Nofoa
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Hawaii
- Wenk v. O'Reilly
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Mobley v. Bronson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- Commonwealth v. Foster
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- Powell v. Tompkins
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Melendres v. Arpaio
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Family Serv. Ass'n v. Wells Twp
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Injury Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Guardado v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court
- People v. Barner
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Illinois
- Commonwealth v. Jackson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- Brown v. Eddie World, Inc.
Civil Rights, Juvenile Law Supreme Court of Nevada
- Smith v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court
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Court: Vermont Supreme CourtCitation: 2015 VT 55 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law |
Respondent T.S.S. appealed a Superior Court decision granting the commissioner of the Department of Mental Health's application for a continued order of non-hospitalization (ONH) compelling T.S.S. to continue undergoing mental-health treatment. T.S.S. argued that the superior court erred in interpreting 18 V.S.A. 7101(16) and applying it to the evidence. T.S.S. suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. T.S.S. "has demonstrated a clear pattern that for a short period of time, despite denying that he has a mental illness, he, on orders of non-hospitalization, will take medications and improve significantly. But when he is off the order of non-hospitalization, he quickly goes off medications and deteriorates." Over the fifteen-year history testified to at the hearing, there was no evidence that T.S.S. exhibited assaultive behavior or posed a danger to others. There was evidence, however, that at times T.S.S. posed a danger to himself. In June 2013, the commissioner filed an application for continued treatment. T.S.S. did not contest the application and stipulated to entry of the order. On May 27, 2014, the superior court granted the commissioner's application. T.S.S. appealed. Upon review of the Superior Court's interpretation of 7101(6), the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard to the evidence, and that the evidence and findings did not support a continued ONH in this case.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 13-4188 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Stafford was convicted of conspiring with four others to bomb a bridge near Cleveland in connection with their membership in a spinoff of Occupy Wall Street. Stafford had a history of mental illness, but, after a competency hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial and granted his motion, supported by his appointed counsel, to represent himself at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court could likely have exercised its discretion, recognized by the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, to impose counsel under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of that discretion in this case to grant Stafford’s motion and permit Stafford to defend himself. The court carefully examined Stafford’s ability to represent himself, and standby counsel was provided. The court upheld application of a Guidelines enhancement for crimes of terrorism.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 11-3996 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was allowed to file in forma pauperis (IFP). He currently owes a filing fee of $350 to the Clerk of the District Court and $505 to the Clerk of the Third Circuit. Siluk argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(2), only requires a 20% deduction from his prison account each month until both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in the order in which they were incurred. The government argued that section 1915(b) requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are paid, which would result in a 40-percent deduction from Siluk’s account. After noting a conflict among the circuits, the Third Circuit adopted the sequential recoupment rule: section 1915 permits the recoupment of only 20% of a prisoner’s monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civilactions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 13-1674 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of drug-trafficking and one count of money laundering. Defendant was sentenced to a 168-month term of imprisonment, a sentence that was at the bottom of his Guidelines imprisonment range. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate Defendant’s due process rights where it allowed Defendant to present evidence of his alleged minor role in the crimes, allowed Defendant to testify regarding the alleged coercion he felt from his co-defendants, and cross-examined Defendant as to whether he faced retaliation after he left the conspiracy; (2) Defendant was not entitled to a minor role adjustment; (3) the district court did not err by declining to award a downward departure for coercion and duress; and (4) Defendant’s sentence was reasonable.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 12-57262 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law |
Here a panel of the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion filed on February 25, 2015 and replaced it with this amended opinion. The panel reversed the district’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in a suit filed by Plaintiff, a former employee of Sears. Plaintiff alleged three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The panel concluded that Plaintiff presented triable claims under FEHA that deserved trial. The panel additionally noted (1) it was beside the point that some of Plaintiff’s evidence was self-serving because such testimony was admissible, though absent corroboration, it may have limited weight; and (2) a district court could disregard a self-serving declaration that stated only conclusions and not facts that would be admissible evidence. Remanded.
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Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket:SC19079 | Opinion Date: April 21, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital felony and arson murder, among other offenses. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his due process rights were violated because the State had failed to disclose a note written by a police detective containing details concerning the length of time that the fire burned inside the victim’s apartment prior to being discovered. First habeas counsel failed to pursue the claim, and consequently, the first habeas court rejected that claim as abandoned. Petitioner subsequently filed this habeas petition, alleging that the State withheld the evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his first habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue and prove that claim. The second habeas court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Court remanded. The third habeas court rejected the petition. The Appellate Court reversed in part and remanded with direction to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial because his rights under Brady were violated and that Petitioner’s first habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to establish that violation.
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 140494 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Tax Law |
At issue in this appeal was the constitutionality of the statutory framework under which Iowa taxes the delivery of natural gas at variable tax rates depending on volume and the taxpayer’s geographic location within the state. Plaintiff filed with the Iowa Department of Revenue a claim for a refund of replacement tax Plaintiff paid for certain tax years, asserting that the replacement tax in Iowa Code 437A.5(2) violates the federal Equal Protection Clause, Iowa Const. art. I, 6, and the dormant Commerce Clause because it is based on the natural gas competitive service area in which a taxpayer is located. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s refund claims and rejected the constitutional challenges to the replacement tax. The district court also denied each of Plaintiff’s constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a rational basis exists for the variable excise tax imposed on the delivery of natural gas under section 437A.5, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or Iowa Const. art. I, 6; and (2) the natural gas delivery tax framework does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 13-3777, Docket: 13-3076 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Makiel was convicted of the 1988 murder of Hoch and the armed robbery of a gas station where she worked. After exhaustion of state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois courts did not apply federal law unreasonably in concluding that Makiel’s counsel was not ineffective in selecting the issues to pursue on appeal: One issue she raised drew a remand, and, although the other two issues did not prevail, each drew a dissenting opinion. An evidentiary ruling preventing impeachment of a prosecution witness with a pending forgery charge was not clearly a stronger issue than those she raised, nor was the exclusion of testimony about the reputations of prosecution witnesses. The state court did not act unreasonably in finding no violation of Makiel’s constitutional right to compulsory process by exclusion of the testimony of an 11-year-old, who would have blamed another young boy for the murder. The proffered testimony was uncorroborated at the time. Its exclusion was an error and was the basis for the state court’s remand. By the time the state courts decided the constitutional issue, however, he had disavowed his proffered testimony, and there was no reason to think it would have been probative or reliable.
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Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:104266 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense; (2) the district court did not commit clear error by failing to instruct on second-degree intentional murder; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by vouching for the credibility of some witnesses, discussing facts not in evidence, and disparaging the defense, but the statements did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (4) the district court did not err in excluding evidence suggesting that a third party might have had a motive to commit the murder; (5) Defendant did not preserve his argument that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting cross-examination of a state witness; and (6) the presumed instructional error and the instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not cumulatively deny Defendant a fair trial.
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 14-0173 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury-waived trial, Petitioner was found guilty of battery. The court found that the battery was sexually motivated and ordered Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the battery conviction but reversed the finding that the offense was sexually motivated, holding (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to provide pretrial notice of its intent to seek a finding of sexual motivation, and the trial court’s finding of sexual motivation and concomitant registration requirements constituted plain error requiring reversal; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Petitioner committed battery.
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 14-0671 | Opinion Date: April 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law |
Prior to his termination, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, a tin plate manufacturer, as a technician operator. After his termination, Petitioner and his wife (Petitioners) filed this action seeking damages for retaliatory discharge and loss of consortium, alleging that Petitioner was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and making complaints to Respondent about those permit violations. Respondents removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity. The federal district court then certified a question to the West Virginia supreme Court, which answered the question as follows: An employee who alleges that he was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under authority of the WPCA and making complaints to his employer about those permit violations has established the predicate substantial public policy required to prima facie prove that the employer’s motivation for the discharge was the contravention of public policy.
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