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Friday, March 06, 2015

Civil Rights

Weekly Summaries Distributed March 6, 2015
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People v. Rebulloza

Court: California Court of Appeal Docket:H040847Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Rebulloza pleaded no contest to one count of indecent exposure for exposing himself on a street corner in San José. The trial court granted a three-year term of probation to include one year in county jail as a condition of probation and ordered him to complete a sex offender management program as mandated by Penal Code section 1203.067. Under subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4), the court ordered defendant to “waive any privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examinations which shall be part of the sex offender management program” and “waive any psychotherapist/patient privilege to enable communication between the sex offender management professional and the probation officer.” Rebulloza challenged the constitutionality of the waivers. The court of appeal held that the condition requiring a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment under the 1984 Supreme Court decision, Minnesota v. Murphy, and construed the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as requiring waiver only insofar as necessary to enable communication between the probation officer and the psychotherapist, so that it is not overbroad in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to privacy.
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United States v. Valdez-Novoa

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 12-50336Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion and dissent filed on July 28, 2014 in which a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction for attempting to enter the United States without consent after having been previously removed. Here the panel amended the opinion and dissent, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Defendant collaterally attacked the underlying removal order, arguing that the immigration judge (IJ) erred in concluding that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony and therefore violated his right to due process by failing to advise him of his apparent eligibility for voluntary departure relief. The panel affirmed the conviction, holding (1) even if the IJ should have informed Defendant of his apparent eligibility for voluntary departure, Defendant was not prejudiced by the error, and therefore, the removal order was not fundamentally unfair under 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3); and (2) the conviction based on Defendant’s videotaped confession did not run afoul of the corpus delicti doctrine.
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State v. Thorndike

Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 131403Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and one count of lascivious acts with a child. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a lascivious-acts jury instruction that he claimed was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court addressed only Defendant’s claim regarding counsel’s response to the lascivious-acts instruction and let the court of appeals’ affirmance on the remaining issues stand as the final decision of the Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to object to the lascivious-acts instruction, and therefore, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must fail.
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United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 14-10086Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it.
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Seifert v. Unified Government

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 13-3153Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual.
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Merryfield v. Sullivan

Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:110662, Docket:110663Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law
Petitioners were residents of a state hospital and involuntary participants in the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment program at the hospital. Petitioners filed petitions for habeas corpus relief challenging the Program’s implementation of a new administrative grievance procedure. The district court summarily denied the petitions and assessed the costs of filing the action against each petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petitions but reversed the assignment of costs to Petitioners. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, whenever a person civilly committed files a habeas petition relating to his or her commitment, the costs shall be assessed to the counties in which the petitioners were determined to be sexually violent predators.
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Commonwealth v. Sheridan

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial CourtDocket: SJC-11543Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Police officers stopped Defendant for driving with an unilluminated headlight. During the stop, the officers saw in the vehicle a one-ounce bag of marijuana. The officers ordered Defendant out of the vehicle and conducted a search of the vehicle in which they discovered two other bags of marijuana. Defendant was booked on charges of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The officers seized and searched Defendant’s cellular telephone, finding text messages they identified as being consistent with sales of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana found in his vehicle and the text messages discovered on his phone on the grounds that “police observation of one ounce or less of marijuana is insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the probable cause necessary to conduct a search.” The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the officers were permitted to enter the vehicle to effect the forfeiture of the marijuana they saw. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officers’ entry into the vehicle was impermissible because they lacked probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime, and therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the searches of Defendant’s vehicle and of his cellular telephone must be suppressed.
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Flood v. Bank of Am. Corp.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 14-1068Opinion Date: February 27, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law
Plaintiff was a customer service employee at a Bank. When Plaintiff could no longer endure disparate treatment due to her bisexuality she received at the Bank, she stopped reporting to work. The Bank then terminated her for job abandonment. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued the Bank for employment discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and for defamation under Maine common law. The case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment to the Bank. The First Circuit (1) vacated summary judgment as to the wrongful termination and hostile work environment portions of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, holding holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that (i) the Bank’s explanation for firing Plaintiff was pretextual and that she was actually fired because of her sexual orientation, and (ii) Plaintiff had endured sufficiently pervasive harassment to alter the conditions of her employment; and (2) affirmed as to the balance of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim as well as on her defamation claims, holding that, in regards to these claims, the district court did not err in its judgment.
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Wesley v. Campbell

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 13-5960Opinion Date: March 2, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law
Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause.
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State v. Riley

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket:SC19109Opinion Date: March 10, 2015
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller.
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