Weekly Summaries Distributed February 6, 2015
- City of Wichita v. Molitor
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- Saunders-El v. Rohde
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- State v. Loyuk
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Nebraska Supreme Court
- State v. Roberts
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court
- State v. Barela
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court
- State v. Jones
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court
- Summum v. Pleasant Grove City
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law Utah Supreme Court
- Jones v. Butler
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- State v. Hosier
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Missouri
- Klunder v. Brown University
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Harris v. Lasseigne
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Wagoner v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Family Law Montana Supreme Court
- Commonwealth v. Santiago
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- State v. Beaulieu
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Minnesota Supreme Court
- Burrell v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Minnesota Supreme Court
- Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government Contracts U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Aldaba v. Marshall County
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- Carr v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court
- Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Ghost Bear v. United States
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- Hilde v. City of Eveleth
Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- Sims v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court
- State v. Johnson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law South Dakota Supreme Court
- State v. Rosales
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law South Dakota Supreme Court
- Abarra v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law Supreme Court of Nevada
|
|
|
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:104940 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
A law enforcement officer, while working on a saturation patrol, stopped a vehicle driven by Defendant and conducted a DUI investigation. Defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test but passed the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests. The officer subsequently requested a preliminary breath test (PBT), the results of which led to Defendant’s arrest and conviction for DUI. Defendant moved to suppress the PBT and breath test results. At the suppression hearing, the district court found that although an HGN test result was inadmissible at trial, it could be used to support “probable cause,” and, under the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion to request the PBT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) the HGN test could be used to establish reasonable suspicion of DUI that would permit a request for a PBT; and (2) even if the HGN test results were excluded, the officer had enough other evidence to form a reasonable suspicion of DUI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the HGN test results were inappropriately relied upon to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that permitted the officer to request that Defendant submit to a PBT, and the error was not harmless. Remanded.
|
| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 14-1570 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After his acquittal by a jury on burglary charges, Saunders-El sued members of the Rockford, Illinois police department, alleging that they planted his blood at the crime scene in an attempt to frame him. His complaint included a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that by fabricating evidence, the officers offended his due process rights, and state law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers, reasoning that fabricating evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights and cannot support a section 1983 action; such an allegation must instead be brought as a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on different grounds. A criminal defendant’s due process rights may be violated—actionable by way of 42 U.S.C. 1983—when the evidence against him is fabricated. However, due process is not implicated when, as here, the defendant is released on bond following his arrest and acquitted at trial. The rule cannot be circumvented simply by reframing such an allegation as a Brady claim: alleging that the police officers who supposedly fabricated the evidence failed to reveal their misconduct to the prosecution.
|
| Court: Nebraska Supreme CourtCitation: 289 Neb. 967 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee for having sex with a parolee while he was employed as an officer by the Department of Correctional Services. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it did not show that he had control over the parolee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) Defendant’s conviction under the relevant statutes did not violate his rights to intimate association and equal protection; and (3) the district court adequately instructed the jury.
|
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2015 UT 24 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to five charges of sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges arose from the discovery of child pornography on Defendant’s laptop computer. Defendant appealed, challenging several of the district court’s pretrial rulings, many of them related to the propriety of law enforcement’s use of the Wyoming Toolkit, a computer program and database used to identify child pornography shared over the Internet with peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of child pornography found on Defendant’s computer, as the government’s use of the Wyoming Toolkit to identify child pornography in files shared on a P2P network is not a search; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to compel discovery of the Wyoming Toolkit; (3) the classifications created by Utah’s sexual exploitation of a minor statute are constitutional, and Defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute’s purported disparate treatment of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude expert testimony related to the Wyoming Toolkit.
|
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2015 UT 22 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction misstating the requirement of mens rea as applied to the elements of first-degree rape; and (2) the statutory standard for nonconsent under Utah Code 76-5-406 does not establish the sum and substance of all circumstances amounting to nonconsent but simply prescribes the circumstances in which the legislature forecloses a jury finding of consent as a matter of public policy. The Court also clarified and the standard for granting a defendant’s request for a victim’s medical records under Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b).
|
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2015 UT 19 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, aggravated robbery, and unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Y-STR DNA evidence linking Defendant to the murder weapon; (2) the trial court did not err when it refused to admit the entire transcript or video of Defendant’s second police interview after a State witness testified to portions of the interview at trial; (3) defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance in his cross-examination of one of the detectives who conducted the second interview; (4) the trial court did not err when it admitted an officer’s testimony about the frequency of drug-related crimes; (5) the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (6) the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for murder and aggravated robbery; and (7) Defendant failed to demonstrate cumulative error that undermined confidence in the verdict.
|
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2015 UT 31 | Opinion Date: January 30, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Since 1971, a monument displaying a representation of the Ten Commandments tablets has stood in a park owned by the City of Pleasant Grove. In 2003, Summum, a corporation sole and church, offered to donate and erect a “Seven Aphorisms” monument in the park that was similar to the Ten Commandments monument. The City declined Summum’s offer. After unsuccessfully suing in federal court, Summum sued in federal court. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the placement of a monument on public property was a form of government speech not regulated by the Free Speech Clause. Summum subsequently sued in state court, alleging that the City had violated the religious liberty clause of the state Constitution and seeking an injunction requiring the City to display the Seven Aphorisms monument. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the religious liberty clause of the Utah Constitution does not require the district court to force the City to permanently display the Seven Aphorisms monument because the neutrality test adopted in Soc’y of Separationists v. Whitehead to determine whether a government action amounts to an unconstitutional appropriation of public money for religious exercise does not apply in the context of public monuments.
|
| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 14-1638 | Opinion Date: February 3, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Jones was charged with a 1998 Chicago shooting and convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder. After exhausting state appeals and post-conviction remedies, he sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming: that his convictions were based on insufficient evidence; that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel; and that his rights to due process were violated by the denial of a post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court noted that the primary witness’s testimony was corroborated; that, in light of all of the evidence, Jones was not prejudiced by any of his attorney’s claimed failings; and that, absent a constitutional claim, the district court was correct in denying habeas relief for the failure of the Illinois courts to hold an evidentiary hearing.
|
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket:SC93855 | Opinion Date: February 3, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, first-degree burglary, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even assuming the police violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, evidence seized from Defendant’s person and car was admissible because Defendant’s flight and the nature of the alleged violation purged the evidence of any taint of an illegal stop; (2) there was sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant for Defendant’s apartment; (3) evidence of other weapons and ammunition unrelated to the crime was relevant and therefore admissible; (4) the victim’s statements on an application for a protective order and to her landlord about Defendant were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine; (5) a note found in Defendant’s car was authenticated by circumstantial evidence; (6) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for first-degree burglary; and (7) Defendant’s sentence was proportional.
|
| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 13-1769 | Opinion Date: February 3, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law |
Appellant, a student at Brown University, was suspended for three semesters after a number of students and staff submitted complaints regarding his behavior. Appellant filed an eleven-count complaint in the district court of Rhode Island against the University, numerous individuals associated with the University, and its police department (collectively, Appellees), alleging, among other claims, that Appellees’ conduct during his disciplinary proceeding and during his removal from campus violated his constitutional rights and state law. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding that the University was not a state actor subject to federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1983; (2) granting Appellees’ motion to amend their answer to include a statute of limitations defense; and (3) disposing of Appellant’s claims on Appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as the Rhode Island tolling statute did not toll Appellant’s claims.
|
| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 14-1033 | Opinion Date: February 4, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
In 2009, Pontiac Officer Lasseigne shot and killed Craft, a 14-year-old male after responding to a 911 call, reporting males with guns were walking west on Ypsilanti Avenue. Officers testified that Craft ran from Ypsilanti Avenue, drawing a gun, and that he aimed a gun at the officers. The district court rejected several claims in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit filed by Craft’s estate, but denied Lasseigne’s motion for summary judgment, finding that he was not entitled to qualified immunity or governmental immunity under Michigan law because there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Craft was holding the shotgun when he was shot. The court noted that Craft was shot only once, while officer training protocol would call for multiple shots in the face of imminent danger; that still shots from the police video depict Craft pinned–at least to some extent–to the fence; and that the weapon did not have any blood on it, while both the fence and vehicle were splattered with blood. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal of the denial of summary judgment, affirmed denial of governmental immunity, and remanded.
|
| Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 13-3839 | Opinion Date: February 4, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Wagoner, a paraplegic since a 1996 accident, is incarcerated by IDOC. Five years into his confinement, Wagoner filed a complaint, asserting that IDOC failed to accommodate his disability, citing humiliating toileting arrangements; a cell so small that Wagoner had to move his wheelchair to allow his cellmate to use the toilet; sidewalks that caused him to tip out of his wheelchair; no access to the weight room or the library; problems with his wheelchair; failures to provide other medical supplies; exclusion from job training; and transportation in a vehicle not equipped for wheelchairs. IDOC argued that Wagoner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Wagoner sought a “Pavey hearing.” The court denied the motion, stating that Wagoner had not established that a dispute of fact existed and could use his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion to create a record. Wagoner filed a brief opposing summary judgment and a second Pavey motion, with a deposition excerpt detailing IDOC’s threats when he filed grievances and support for his futility claim. The district court granted IDOC summary judgment, refusing to consider the Pavey motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is better practice to hold a Pavey hearing before considering summary judgment, but there was no reversible error. The court correctly concluded that no material facts were disputed.
|
| Court: Montana Supreme CourtCitation: 2015 MT 31 | Opinion Date: February 3, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, |
|
No comments:
Post a Comment