Summaries for January 24, 2015
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| Docket: 13-3593 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
A jury convicted Garten of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in the conduct of telemarketing, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 2326(1). The district court then sentenced her to 168 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release, and ordered Garten to pay $909,278 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction, the admission of testimony that a non-testifying co-conspirator had pleaded guilty to the same offense, the court’s statement, “that’s accurate” in overruling Garten’s objection to testimony that the “gross amount” on an exhibit was the amount “stolen from the consumer,” and that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court’s finding that the loss involved totaled nearly $6 million.
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| Docket: 14-1953 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Government & Administrative Law |
The Association of Administrative Law Judges, a union, represents the Social Security Administration’s administrative law judges in collective bargaining pursuant to the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Association and ALJs employed by the SSA sued, claiming that, by setting a goal that its ALJs decide 500-700 social security disability cases a year, the Administration has interfered with their decisional independence, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(d)(2), 3105. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 precluded resort to the APA by creating remedies for “prohibited personnel practices” taken against federal employees, including “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1), (2)(A)(xii), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act for interference with decisional independence does not extend to the incidental consequences of a bona fide production quota.
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| Docket: 13-3421 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Inmates Sorrentino and Neal purchased several items from Stateville’s commissary, but the prison later forbade inmates to possess those items (fans and a typewriter) in their cells. Their property was removed. They filed a proposed class action, alleging that the confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the plaintiffs filed their takings claim in federal court before seeking compensation in an Illinois tribunal.
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| Docket: 14-2725 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Insurance Law |
Visteon, a worldwide manufacturer headquartered in Michigan, sued National Union, from which it had purchased liability insurance between 2000 and 2002. The policy excluded liability resulting from pollution caused by Visteon, except liability arising from a “Completed Operations Hazard.” In 2001, the toxic solvent TCE that was used to clean machinery in Visteon’s Connersville, Indiana plant was discovered to have leaked into the soil and groundwater. Neighboring landowners sued Visteon. National Union has refused to indemnify or defend. Indiana does not enforce standard pollution-exclusion clauses. Michigan law does enforce the more general kind of pollution-exclusion clause found in the policy. The district court ruled that Michigan law governed and held that Visteon was not entitled to coverage under the Completed Operations Hazard clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The risk materialized in Indiana, but that could not have been foreseen. The Indiana victims were compensated by Visteon, and it is unclear what benefit the state would have derived from reimbursement of Visteon’s costs by National Union.” The court rejected Visteon’s argument that its “work” was “completed” each time a contract to supply products made at the plant was performed and concluded that the exception did not apply.
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| Docket: 14-1319 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law |
Holocaust survivors and the heirs of victims sued the Hungarian national railway, the national bank, and private banks for the roles they played in the World War II genocide against Hungarian Jews. In 2012 appeals, the Seventh Circuit held that the national railway and national bank, instrumentalities of the government, could be sued in a U.S. federal court if the plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies or had a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court mandated dismissal of claims against two private banks for lack of personal jurisdiction, but denied requests by Erste Bank to review denial of its motion to dismiss. On remand, the district court dismissed the claims against the national defendants for failure to prove exhaustion of Hungarian remedies and dismissed Erste Bank on forum non conveniens grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, without prejudice. While international law does not require exhaustion of domestic remedies before plaintiffs can say that international law was violated, principles of international comity require that these plaintiffs attempt to exhaust domestic remedies before foreign courts can provide remedies. If plaintiffs find that attempts to pursue remedies in Hungary are frustrated unreasonably or arbitrarily, a U.S. court could hear the claims.
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| Docket: 14-3394 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Civil Procedure |
Plaintiff won a judgment in a breach of contract claim. The court’s memorandum opinion and order, held the defendants liable for “$113,500 plus interest accruing and attorneys’ fees.” When entering the judgment on the docket, the court checked the box indicating that no prejudgment interest would be awarded. Plaintiff moved to “quantify interest based on the memorandum opinion and order.” The defendants filed appeals. Because the district court had not quantified prejudgment interest, the Seventh Circuit ordered the parties to file memoranda explaining why the appeals should not be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the district court addressed the motion to quantify, which it construed as a motion to correct the judgment. Explaining that it had checked the wrong box on the judgment, the court directed plaintiff to move the Seventh Circuit for leave to correct the clerical mistake. Plaintiff filed the motion. The Seventh Circuit held that there is no final judgment to appeal. The award of prejudgment interest is part of a plaintiff’s damages and the district court must quantify damages before a judgment can be final. Even if the clerical mistake were corrected, the judgment would not quantify prejudgment interest and the district court did not address how it would quantify the award.
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| Docket: 13-3654 | Opinion Date: January 23, 2015 |
| Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Public Benefits |
Sprinkle applied for supplemental social security income. After exhausting administrative remedies, Sprinkle sought judicial review of a final decision that he was not disabled. The district court held that the agency failed to properly evaluate evidence of Sprinkle’s disability and reversed. Sprinkle sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. While the EAJA contains a presumptive rate cap of $125 an hour, courts may award enhanced fees if justified because of an increase in the cost of living. The court found that Sprinkle was entitled to fees, but rejected his request for a cost-of-living enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An EAJA claimant seeking an adjustment need not offer proof of the effects of inflation on the particular attorney’s practice or proof that no competent attorney could be found for less than the requested rate. The claimant may rely on a readily available measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that the requested rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill and experience. An affidavit from a single attorney testifying to the prevailing market rate may suffice to meet that burden.
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