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Monday, November 17, 2014

Civil Rights

Weekly Summaries Distributed November 17, 2014
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City of Chicago v. Winston

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 14-1371Opinion Date: November 7, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
Winston sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officer O’Brien used excessive force while detaining Winston at a Chicago police station, tasering him repeatedly and punching him while he was in handcuffs. Winston’s attorneys sought $ 20,000 in compensatory damages and an unspecified amount of punitive damages. The jury found that O’Brien was liable for $1 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages. Winston then sought $336,918 in attorney’s fees under section 1988. The district court found that Winston’s “victory was real, not Pyrrhic,” that Winston’s attorneys could recover fees for all their requested hours but sought too high of an hourly rate, and granted a reduced fee award of $187,467. Winston filed a petition for indemnification and motion for writ of execution against the city. The district court concluded that the city was liable for the fees under the Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The language of the statute gives the city discretion in deciding to indemnify attorney’s fees associated with an award of compensatory damages, and the collective bargaining agreement with the police union did not convert it into a mandate to pay fees.
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Shepard v. Houston

Court: Nebraska Supreme CourtCitation: 289 Neb. 399Opinion Date: November 7, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4106(2) provides for retroactive application of its requirement that inmates convicted of a felony sex offense or other specified offense submit a DNA sample before being discharged from confinement. The statute further provides that an inmate will forfeit his past and future good time credit if the inmate refuses to submit a DNA sample. George Shepard was an inmate who was sentenced before the passage of section 29-4106(2) and refused to submit a DNA sample. Facing the impending forfeiture of his good time credit, Shepard filed a complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the application of section 29-4106 as violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The district court declared section 29-4106(2) unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions as applied to Shepard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the retroactive application of section 29-4106(2) violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
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United States v. Worthy

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 13-1831Opinion Date: November 7, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
An initial criminal complaint issued against Defendant on August 6, 2010 charging him with a drug-related offense. Over the next fourteen months, the government brought four superseding indictments against him. Five days before jury empanelment was set to begin, Defendant moved to dismiss the fourth superseding indictment, asserting impermissible trial delay. The government conceded a breach of 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), which requires a criminal defendant to be brought to trial within seventy days of the filing of an indictment. The district court determined that the appropriate remedy for exceeding the statutory time limit was a dismissal of the fourth superseding indictment without prejudice and that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had not been violated. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the district court (1) properly decided that dismissal without prejudice was the appropriate remedy for the Speedy Trial Act violation; and (2) properly concluded that Defendant had not been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
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Carroll v. Carman

Court: U.S. Supreme Court Docket: 14-212Opinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Pennsylvania State Police received a report that Zita had stolen a car and loaded handguns and might have fled to the Carman home and sent Officers Carroll and Roberts to that home. The officers parked at the far rear of the corner-lot property, and walked toward the house. They saw a sliding glass door that opened onto a ground-level deck. Carroll thought the door “looked like a customary entryway,” so he and Roberts decided to knock on it. As they stepped onto the deck, a man exited the house and “aggressively approached” them. The officers identified themselves, explained they were looking for Zita, and asked the man for his name. The man refused to answer, but turned away and appeared to reach for his waist. Carroll grabbed his arm to make sure he was not reaching for a weapon. He twisted away and fell into the yard. A woman came outside, identified herself as Karen Carman, identified the man as her husband, and stated that Zita was not there. Karen consented to a search. The officers searched the house, did not find Zita, then left. The Carmans sued under 42 U. S. C. 1983. Carroll argued that his entry was lawful under the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement, which he contended, allows officers to knock on someone’s door, so long as they stay “on those portions of [the] property that the general public is allowed to go on.” The Carmans responded that a normal visitor would have gone to their front door. The jury returned a verdict for Carroll. The Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Carroll was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court declined to address whether an officer may conduct a “knock and talk” at any entrance that is open to visitors or only the front door, but stated that Carroll may reasonably have concluded that he was allowed to knock on any door that was open to visitors.
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Johnson v. City of Shelby

Court: U.S. Supreme Court Docket: 13-1318Opinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
Shelby, Mississippi police officers alleged that they were fired, not for deficient performance, but because they brought to light criminal activities of an alderman. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting their due process claims for failure to invoke 42 U. S. C. 1983. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Federal pleading rules call for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2); they do not contemplate dismissal for imperfect statement of the legal theory asserted. No heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke section 1983 expressly in order to state a claim. No qualified immunity analysis was implicated here, as the officers asserted a constitutional claim against the city only, not against any municipal officer. The complaint was not deficient in informing the city of the factual basis for the lawsuit.
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Williams v. City of Cleveland

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 13-4162Opinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Williams was arrested on non-felony charges of driving with a license suspended for failure to pay a traffic ticket. After Williams paid her ticket and fines, she was instructed to undress and shower in the presence of a corrections officer and two other female detainees, where she was also subjected to a visual body cavity search, and was instructed to bend at the waist and spread her buttocks. While she was bent over, an officer sprayed her with delousing solution all over her naked body, including into her anus. There was no indication that Williams had lice. Williams was released the same day. While her putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether pretrial detainees could be strip searched as a matter of course upon entry into a correctional facility absent individualized suspicion. The district court stayed Williams’s action. In 2012 the Court upheld a blanket strip-search policy. The district court denied a motion to file an amended complaint clarifying that plaintiffs “not only complain about the use of delousing on all detainees, but also about the manner,” particularly spraying delousing agent all over their naked bodies, “specifically aim[ing]” at their genitals,” instead of using less invasive methods, such as permitting detainees to apply the solution. According to the district court, the question was resolved by Florence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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State v. Miguel

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket:10-131Opinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal concerned Defendant’s third attempt to challenge his plea and sentence with a motion to reduce or correct sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial justice denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that his life sentence was illegal because he should have been convicted of manslaughter, which carries a maximum sentence of thirty years, and that the continued imposition of his purportedly illegal sentence constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment to both the federal and the state Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the hearing justice’s decision to deny the Rule 35 motion and that Defendant’s constitutional arguments had no merit.
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State v. Clark

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket:M2010-00570-SC-R11-CDOpinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of seven counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery arising from the sexual abuse of his children. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions because the State presented adequate evidence corroborating Defendant’s confession to his wife; (2) the trial court properly refused to suppress surreptitiously-recorded conversations between Defendant and his wife; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant possessed and viewed adult pornography, but the error was harmless; and (4) any error in jury instructions given during trial that the mental state of “recklessness” could support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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State v. Sanders

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket:M2011-00962-SC-R11-CDOpinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Defendant was indicted on six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. Defendant moved to suppress a surreptitiously-recorded conversation with the child’s mother, who was secretly cooperating with the police in their investigation of the abuse. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the admission of Defendant’s recorded conversation with the child's mother did not violate his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination because, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s incriminating statements were admissible because they were made voluntarily.
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Lightfoot v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 13-14631Opinion Date: November 10, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law, Family Law
Plaintiff filed suit against the School District, her former employer, for violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that the School District is not an "arm of the State," and instead operates more like a county or similar political subdivision to which Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that the School District was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In regards to plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the School District where the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to construe plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim as being based on different facts than the ones actually pled in her ADA count. Even when construed liberally, plaintiff's complaint did not give the School District notice that her ADA retaliation claim was based on her request for FMLA leave.
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Dorsey v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket:SC93168Opinion Date: November 12, 2014
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Appellant was convicted and sentenced for two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on each count. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion to vacate his convictions and sentences pursuant to Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The motion judge overruled Appellant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s claims relating to the disclosure and investigation of an autosomal DNA profile were not preserved for review; and (2) the motion court did not clearly err in overruling Appellant’s Brady violation claim and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
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