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Weekly Summaries Distributed November 13, 2015
- Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- State v. Robinson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court
- State v. Cullen
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law Nebraska Supreme Court
- State v. Poe
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Nebraska Supreme Court
- State v. Noel
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law Supreme Court of Indiana
- McGinn v. State
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Wyoming Supreme Court
- Mullenix v. Luna
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Supreme Court
- Mullins v. Cyranek
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- State of Texas v. United States
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Matthews v. White
Civil Rights, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Board v. Bradshaw
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Davis v. Comm’r of Corr.
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Connecticut Supreme Court
- Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law California Court of Appeal
- Strake v. Robinwood W. Cmty. Improvement Dist.
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law Supreme Court of Missouri
- Spectra Commc'n Grp. v. City of Cameron, MO
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- Peery v. City of Miami
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- Mason v. City of Lafayette
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist.
Civil Rights, Education Law, Legal Ethics U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Carroll v. Lawton Independent School
Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- Kazolias v. IBEW
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- State v. Tuttle
Civil Rights, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court
- State v. Blankenship
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Ohio
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 14-5603 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Butler, age 25, arrived at Hopkins County Detention Center to serve a misdemeanor sentence. A tower operator saw Butler put something in his mouth and swallow, and relayed her observation to deputies, who started booking procedures. Butler vomited twice. Deputies noticed that Butler appeared to be under the influence and was sweating profusely. While answering questions, his demeanor deteriorated and he had difficulty standing. Butler stated that he had an MRSA infection, high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, and osteoporosis. He listed several prescribed medications and denied drug or alcohol addiction. The deputies did not want to admit Butler because of his condition. A licensed practical nurse examined Butler and instructed the deputies to admit Butler. As an LPN, she lacked the credentials to diagnose any illness, but was aware that untreated MRSA infection could lead to sepsis and death. Although staff placed Butler on suicide watch, there is no evidence that Butler was evaluated for suicidal ideation, nor any evidence that Butler received blood pressure medication while confined or that the nurses questioned why his blood pressure fell, absent medication. Butler died three days later from MRSA complications. The court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983b on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of material fact and that the facility's medical contractor is not entitled to governmental immunity on the state-law claim.
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Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket:90196 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
The State charged Appellant with multiple offenses related to the murders of six women. The murders constituted parts of a common scheme or course of conduct. Appellant was sentenced to death for his convictions for two counts of capital murder. On appeal, Appellant raised nineteen general claims of reversible error covering the entire trial proceedings, as well as a variety of sub-claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant’s capital murder conviction charged in Count II; (2) reversed Appellant’s capital murder conviction charged in Count III and his first-degree murder conviction charged in Count V as unconstitutionally multiplicitous with the capital murder conviction in Count II; (3) affirmed the remainder of Appellant’s convictions; (4) affirmed Appellant’s sentence of death under his capital murder conviction in Count II; and (5) vacated the portion of Appellant’s sentence designating certain of his crimes sexually motivated and remanded for a correction of the journal entry.
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Court: Nebraska Supreme CourtCitation: 292 Neb. 30 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of an infant in her care. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that evidence of the infant’s prior injuries while in her care should have been excluded as prior bad acts under Neb. R. Evid. 404. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of allowing the admission of the prior injuries, as the prior injuries were inextricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument; (3) Defendant’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance.
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Court: Nebraska Supreme CourtCitation: 292 Neb. 60 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court to decide if Defendant’s trial counsel failed to utilize a statement the State’s key witness made to Defendant’s girlfriend to the effect that Defendant was innocent. On remand, the district court again overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) excluding certain out-of-court statements on hearsay grounds; and (2) concluding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 14-0174 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing in a vehicle, possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), and possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine). Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence a police officer discovered upon searching Defendant’s vehicle, arguing that no probable cause existed for either the traffic stop or the subsequent search. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and resultant sentences and remanded, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant’s vehicle was unlawful, and therefore, the circuit court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during that search.
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Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket:49S00-1407-PL-494 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Plaintiffs, as a certified class, challenged the constitutionality of the program utilized by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) in the processing of applications for personalized license plates (PLPs), arguing that the decision making process used in denying or revoking PLPs violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the class, concluding that the statute that authorizes the BMV to refuse to issue PLPs and its related policies are vague, overbroad, and lacking in content-neutrality and that the Bureau violates due process safeguards by providing insufficient reasons for a denial or revocation of a PLP. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) PLPS are government speech; and (2) therefore, the statute and policies at issue in this case are constitutional.
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Court: Wyoming Supreme CourtCitation: 2015 WY 140 | Opinion Date: November 6, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery and possession of a weapon with intent to threaten. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the prosecutor improperly asked him a series of questions during his testimony at trial in which the prosecutor repeated statements made by Defendant’s daughter and asked, “was she lying?”; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it allowed evidence of prior discharge of a gun. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s questioning was improper, and the error was prejudicial; and (2) the absence of appropriate findings and discussion regarding the admission of the discharge evidence hinders review of the district court’s decision to admit the evidence. Remanded.
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Court: U.S. Supreme Court Docket: 14-1143 | Opinion Date: November 9, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Sergeant Baker, with a warrant, approached Leija’s car at a restaurant and stated that he was under arrest. Leija sped onto I-27. Leija led Baker and Texas Trooper Rodriguez on an 18-minute chase at 85-110 mph. Leija twice called dispatch, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot the officers. The dispatcher broadcast Leija’s threats and a report that Leija might be intoxicated. Officer Ducheneaux, who was trained in using tire spike strips, manned a spike strip beneath an overpass. Trooper Mullenix drove to that overpass, where he radioed a plan to shoot and disable the car. Rodriguez responded “10– 4.” Mullenix asked the dispatcher to inform his supervisor, Byrd, of his plan Before receiving a response, Mullenix took a shooting position. Byrd responded to “see if the spikes work first.” Whether Mullenix heard the response is disputed. Deputy Shipman informed Mullenix that another officer was beneath the overpass. Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took his position, he spotted Leija’s vehicle and fired six shots. Leija’s car engaged the spikes, hit the median, and rolled. Leija was killed by Mullenix’s shots. Apparently, no shots hit the radiator, hood, or engine block. Leija’s estate sued Mullenix under 42 U. S. C. 1983. Mullenix unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that immediacy of risk was a disputed fact. The Supreme Court reversed on the qualified immunity question, declining to address whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer; whatever the wisdom of Mullenix’s choice, Supreme Court precedents do not indicate that he “beyond debate” acted unreasonably.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 14-3817 | Opinion Date: November 9, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Cincinnati officers, assigned to provide security outside the Black Family Reunion at Sawyer Point, were informed that young African American males were throwing guns over the fence to individuals who were inside. After Cyranek and other officers approached, those individuals ran toward downtown. The officers were then told to provide extra security at Government Square and Fountain Square. Cyranek saw 16-year-old Mullins walking from Fountain Square and recognized two individuals with Mullins from Sawyer Point. Cyranek observed Mullins holding and trying to conceal his right side, which led Cyranek to suspect that Mullins possessed a weapon. Cyranek followed him, but did not alert other officers or radio in his concerns. During a confrontation that lasted two minutes, Cyranek held Mullins to the ground, Mullins brandished a gun and gained enough freedom from Cyranek’s grip to throw his weapon 10-15 feet behind Cyranek. As Mullins threw his gun, Cyranek rose from his crouched position and fired twice. Video footage shows that, at most, five seconds elapsed between when Mullins threw his firearm and when Cyranek fired his final shot. Cyranek retrieved Mullins’s gun and placed it near Mullins’s feet. Mullins was pronounced dead at a hospital. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity, calling the shooting a “tragedy,” but finding Cyranek’s split-second decision to use deadly force “not objectively unreasonable.”
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 15-40333 | Opinion Date: November 9, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law |
Three movants appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in State of Texas v. United States, where 26 states seek injunctive relief against the United States and several officials of DHS to prevent them from implementing a program entitled “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” (DAPA). Movants are aliens who have lived in the United States for more than ten years, currently live in the Rio Grande Valley, and have minor children who are United States citizens. Movants believe that they are likely to receive grants of deferred action if DAPA goes into effect. The court reversed the district court's order denying intervention because movants satisfy the requirements for intervention by right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court remanded to the district court.
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 13-5901 | Opinion Date: November 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
In 1982, Matthews was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, including in federal court. Having exhausted his judicial remedies, Matthews intends to petition the Governor of Kentucky for clemency under section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution, based on mitigating factors related to his neuropsychological health. The district court denied his request for funding under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to pay for a neuropsychological evaluation to support this argument, but apparently relied on an incorrect rule that section 3599 funding is available only for use in federal proceedings and did not otherwise explain its reasons for denying the request. The Sixth CIrcuit vacated and remanded, noting evidence that in the decades since the 1982 evaluation was conducted, the Bender Gestalt Test administered to Matthews has become “very outdated, rarely used today, and [is] not helpful to gain a full and reliable understanding of the extent of Matthews’ neuropsychological deficits and brain damage.”
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Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 14-3199 | Opinion Date: November 10, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
In September, 2010, Board pleaded guilty to drug trafficking with forfeiture specifications, a felony that carried a mandatory prison term of three-10 years under Ohio law. His plea agreement recommended a seven-year sentence. The court sentenced Board to seven years in prison. Board did not timely appeal his sentence. In June, 2011, Board filed a pro se notice of appeal and motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, asserting that both the court and counsel failed to inform him of his appellate rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals summarily denied Board’s motion. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear the case in December, 2011. Board sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he was denied due process and equal protection when the trial court failed to inform him of his appellate rightsand his subsequent motion for leave to file a delayed appeal was denied, and ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Board’s Ohio motion was a “properly filed” motion for collateral relief that tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations from that date until December 21, 2011, when the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Board’s appeal of the denial of his motion.
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Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket:SC19286 | Opinion Date: November 17, 2015 |
Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The plea agreement stated that Petitioner would receive a total sentence of between twenty and twenty-five years’ imprisonment and that defense counsel had a right to argue for a sentence beneath the twenty-five year cap. At sentencing, defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s recommendation that the trial court should impose the maximum sentence under the agreement. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years imprisonment. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court denied relief, determining that Petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The Appellate Court affirmed
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